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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses upon the meaning of section 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, which guarantees the right to "natural justice". To this end 
the paper undertakes an analysis of the meaning of Article 14(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, since section 27(1) is 
designed to implement Article 14(1) in New Zealand's domestic law. 
Furthermore, because of the close relationship between Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the paper embarks upon a careful study of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights with a view to clarifying the meaning of Article 14(1) 
of the Covenant. The paper then considers the impact of Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant upon the meaning of section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights, and 
concludes that the right to natural justice under section 27(1) applies in a 
wider range of situations, and has a more extensive content, than does the 
right to natural justice at Common Law. 
***************************************** 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 19, OOO words 
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I INTRODUCfION 
This paper focuses upon the meaning of section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights, 
which guarantees the right to the "observance of the principles of natural 
justice" in the determination of a person's rights, obligations and interests. It 
identifies the appropriate approach to the interpretation of section 27(1) of 
the Bill of Rights. Since section 27(1) is designed to implement Article 14(1) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter the 
"Covenant")1 in New Zealand's domestic law, an analysis of that Article is 
central to this enquiry. 
In order to gain a full understanding of the meaning of Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant, it is necessary to consider the meaning of Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter the "European 
Convention"),2 since Article 6(1) of the European Convention is modelled on 
Article 14(1) of the Covenant. To this end, the paper embarks upon a 
detailed study of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
under Article 6( 1) of the European Convention. 
The paper then considers the impact of Article 14(1) of the Covenant upon 
the meaning of section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights. It establishes that section 
27(1), properly interpreted by reference to Article 14(1) of the Covenant, 
affords much more extensive procedural protections to those affected by 
decision-making processes than does the Common Law. 
1 999 UNTS 171. 
2 213 UNTS 221. 
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II ARTICLE 14(1) OF THE COVENANT 
This Part of the paper focuses on the meaning of Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant. To this end, it analyses the practice of the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 14(1) of the Covenant. It also embarks upon a 
detailed study of the jurisprudence of the European Court under Article 6(1) 
of the European Convention, since that jurisprudence is of central importance 
to the proper interpretation of Article 14(1) of the Covenant. Part III of the 
paper will consider some of the implications of the conclusions reached in this 
Part for the meaning of section 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights. 
A Article 14 ( 1) of the Covenant: Interpretation 
The material part of Article 14(1) provides: 
. . . . In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his 
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. . . . . 
The Covenant does not define any of the terms contained in this sentence. 
What is meant by "rights and obligations in a suit at law"? What do 
"independent" and "impartial" denote? What counts as a "tribunal" for the 
purposes of Article 14(1)? In attempting to resolve these questions the 
practice of the Human Rights Committee, established under Article 28 of the 
Covenant, is of central importance. 
The Human Rights Committee is responsible for supervising the 
implementation of the Covenant. States Parties must report periodically to 
the Committee "on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the 
rights [contained in the Covenant] and on the progress made in the enjoyment 
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of those rights".3 The Committee discusses the reports with the 
Representatives of the State Party concerned; and the discussions are 
documented in the summary records of the meetings of the Committee. This 
reporting system is the primary means by which the implementation of the 
Covenant is supervised.4 Under Article 40( 4) of the Covenant the Committee 
is empowered to make such "general comments as it deems appropriate".5 
Moreover, the Committee's powers have been further extended by the 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant.6 Where a State Party ratifies the 
Protocol, the Committee is competent to receive and consider individual 
communications alleging violations of the Covenant by that State Party.7 
3 Article 40(1) of the Covenant. 
4 See M N Shaw International Law (3ed, Grotius, Cambridge, 1991) 209; and generally D McGoldrick The 
Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991). 
5 General comments of the Committee are intended to promote co-operation between States Parties in the 
implementation of the Covenant, summarise the experience of the Committee in examining States Parties' 
reports and draw the attention of States Parties to matters relating to the improvement of the reporting 
procedure and the implementation of the Covenant: UN Doc CCPR/C/18; and see above n 4, Shaw, 209-
210. 
6 999 UNTS 302. 
7 The Optional Protocol does not stipulate what is the legal status of views adopted by the Committee. Shaw 
asserts that "(t]he Committee .. . is not a court with the power of binding decision on the merits of cases": 
above n 4, Shaw, 212; but Brownlie has argued that views adopted by the Committee "in substance involve 
decisions of law and fact, and the Respondent State has a duty to produce explanations and to report the 
remedial steps which may have been taken": I Brownlie (ed F M Brookfield) Treaties and Indigenous 
Peoples (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992) 93. Tomuschat comments: 
Legally, the views formulated by the Human Rights Committee are not binding on the State 
party concerned which remains free to criticize them. Nonetheless, any State party will find it 
hard to reject such findings in so far as they are based on orderly proceedings during which the 
defendant party had ample opportunity to present its submissions. The views of the Human 
Rights Committee gain their authority from their inner qualities of impartiality, objectiveness 
and soberness. If such requirements are met, the view of the Human Rights Committee can 
have a far-reaching impact, at least vis-a-vis such governments which have not outrightly broken 
with the international community and ceased to care any more for concern expressed by 
international bodies. If such a situation arose, however, even a legally binding decision would 
not be likely to be respected. 
C Tomuschat "Evolving Procedural Rules: The UN Human Rights Committee's First Two Years of 
Dealing with Individual Communications" 1 HRLJ 249, 255 (1980). See also PR Ghandhi 'The Human 
Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication" (1986) 57 BYIL 201 , 248-251. 
Pocar argues persuasively that States must comply with the Committee's views, on the basis that 
Article 2(3) of the Covenant requires States to provide an "effective remedy" for a violation of the 
Covenant, and the Optional Protocol provides a machinery to establish the existence of a violation: F 
Pocar "Legal Value of the Human Rights Committee's Views" (1991-92) 7 CHRYB 119. See also J B 
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The practice of the Human Rights Committee under the Covenant is, 
accordingly, of central importance to the proper interpretation of Article 
14(1). It is noteworthy that the Committee has received and considered 
numerous communications alleging violations of Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant;8 and has issued a General Comment in respect of Article 14 as a 
Elkind 'The Optional Protocol: a Bill of Rights for New Zealand" [1990] NZLl 96, 100; J B Elkind 
'The 
Optional Protocol and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" [1991] NZLl 409, 410. Elkin
d's view 
([1990] NZLl at 100) that "the Committee is unquestionably regarded as a law-determining age
ncy for 
obligations arising under the Covenant" is supported by Article 2(3) of the Covenant. 
The Committee itself has recognised a link between Article 2(3) of the Covenant and the 
Optional Protocol. For example, in adopting its views in Edgar A Can6n Garcia v Ecuador, the Com
mittee 
stated: "[i]n accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Covenant, the State party is un
der an 
obligation to take measures to remedy the violations [of Articles 7, 9, and 13 of the Covenant] suff
ered by 
Mr. Cafi6n Garda": Comm No 319/1988, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 (1991), p 5, para 6.
2. The 
Committee has established a procedure to follow up State implementation of its views. For example
, in the 
Can6n Garcia communication, the Committee indicated that: 
[it] would appreciate receiving from the State party, within ninety days of the transmittal to it of 
this decision, all pertinent information on the results of all its investigations, as well as on 
measures taken to remedy the situation, and in order to prevent the repetition of such events in 
the future. 
Id, p 5, para 7. A number of States are complying with this procedure: see, for example, GAOR, 38
th Sess, 
Supp No 40, UN Doc A/38/40 (1983), pp 249 (Canada), 254 (Mauritius), 255 (Finland); GAO
R, 44th 
Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44/40 (1989), p 149 (Finland); GAOR, 45th Sess, Supp No 40, UN
 Doc 
N45/40 (1990), Vol 2, pp 207 (Dominican Republic), 209 (Ecuador and Finland); GAOR, 46th Sess,
 Supp 
No 40, UN Doc N46/40 (1991), p 174 (Finland, the Netherlands, Columbia, Peru and Trinida
d and 
Tobago). 
It is also noteworthy that, during the discussion of Canada's first report to the Committee, the 
Canadian Representative Mr McPhail said that: 
in his country's opinion, the Committee's questions and comments, whether in the context of the 
Covenant or of its Optional Protocol, could have a significant impact and help to increase the 
understanding of the States parties of their obligations under the Covenant. 
Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 9th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 205, p 2,
 para 2 
(1980). Further, a New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussion paper states that "[t]he 
Human 
Rights Committee is a less political and lower profile body than the [Commission on Human Rights
] but it 
plays an important role in ensuring compliance with the Covenant": Discussion Paper for Min
istry of 
Foreign Affairs, "New Zealand and International Human Rights", May 1988, p 7, para 26 (em
phasis 
added). 
8 Bazzano v Uruguay, Comm No 5/1977, GAOR, 34th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N3
4/40 (1979) 124; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Human Rights Committee. Selected Decis
ions Under 
the Optional Protocol (United Nations, New York, 1985) Vol l (hereafter "SD Vol 1"), 40; Sequeira v 
Uruguay, Comm No 6/1977, GAOR, 35th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/35/40 (1980) 127; SD Vo
l 1, 52; 
Lanzo de Netto et alv Uruguay, Comm No 8/1977, GAOR, 35th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/35/40
 (1980) 
111; SD Vol 1, 45;Altesorv Uruguay, Comm No 10/1977, GAOR, 37th Sess, Supp No 40, UN DocA
/37/40 
(1982) 122; SD Vol 1, 105; Z Z v Canada, Comm No 17/1977, SD Vol l, 19 (inadmissible); Pi
nkney v 
Canada, Comm No 27/1978, GAOR, 37th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/37/40 (1982) 101; SD Vo
l 1, 95; 
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whole.9 Important principles have emerged. In Morael v Francelo the 
Committee stated: 
... the concept of a fair hearing in the context of Article 14 (1) of the 
Covenant should be interpreted as requiring a number of conditions, 
Weinberger Weisz v Uruguay, Comm No 28/1978, GAOR, 36th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/36/40
 (1981); 
SD Vol 1, 57; Touron v Uruguay, Comm No 32/1978, GAOR, 36th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc 
A/36/40 
(1981) 120; SD Vol 1, 61; Pietraroia v Uruguay, Comm No 44/1979, GAOR, 36th Sess, Supp No 40, 
UN 
Doc A/36/40 (1981) 153; SD Voll, 76; Borda v Colombia, Comm No 46/1979, GAOR, 37th Sess, S
upp No 
40, UN Doc A/37/40 (1982) 193; SD Vol 1, 139; Salgar de Montejo v Colombia, Comm No 64
/1979, 
GAOR, 37th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/37/40 (1982) 168; SD Vo! 1, 127; Cubas v Uruguay, Co
mm No 
70/1980, GAOR, 37th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/37/40 (1982) 174; SD Vol 1, 130; KL v Den
mark, 
Comm No 81/1980, SD Vol 1, 28 (inadmissible); Estrella v Uruguay, Comm No 74/1980, GAOR, 38
th Sess, 
Supp No 40, UN Doc A/38/40 (1983) 150; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Human 
Rights Committee. Selected Decisions Under the Optional Protocol (United Nations, New York, 198
9) Vol 2 
(hereafter "SD Vol 2"), 93; Vasilskis v Uruguay, Comm No 80/1980, GAOR, 38th Sess, Supp No 
40, UN 
Doc A/38/40 (1983) 173; SD Vo! 2, 105; Y L v Canada, Comm No 112/1981, GAOR, 41st Sess, S
upp No 
40, UN Doc N41/40 (1986) 145; SD Vol 2, 28 (inadmissible); CA v Italy, Comm No 127/1982, GA
OR, 
38th Sess, Supp No 40, Un Doc A/38/40 (1983) 237; SD Vol 2, 39 (inadmissible); Mpandanjila 
v Zaire, 
Comm No 138/1983, GAOR, 41st Sess, Supp No 40, Un Doc N41/40 (1986) 121; SD Vo! 2, 164; Th
omas 
v Uruguay, Comm No 139/1983, GAOR, 40th Sess, Supp No 40, Un Doc N40/40 (1985) 196; SD
 Vol 2, 
168; Magri de Cariboni v Uruguay, Comm No 159/1983, GAOR, 43rd Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N
43/40 
(1988) 184; SD Vol 2, 189; J Kv Canada, Comm No 174/1984, GAOR, 40th Sess, Supp No 40, U
N Doc 
N40/40 (1985) 215; SD Vol 2, 52 (inadmissible); S H B v Canada, Comm No 192/1985, GAOR, 42nd S
ess, 
Supp No 40, UN Doc N42/40 (1987) 174; SD Vol 2, 64 (inadmissible); Avellanal v Peru, Com
m No 
202/1986, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44/40 (1989) 196; Hermoza v Peru, Comm
 No 
203/1986, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44/40 (1989) 196; Morael v France, Com
m No 
207/1986, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44/40 (1989) 210; F G G v the Netherlands, Co
mm 
No 209/1986, GAOR, 42nd Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N42/40 (1987) 180 (inadmissible); H CM
 A v the 
Netherlands, Comm No 213/1986, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44/40 (1989
) 267 
(inadmissible); Robinson v Jamaica, Comm No 223/1987, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44
/40 
(1989) 241; Bolanos v Ecuador, Comm No 238/1987, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40 (1989) 246; B
 de Bet 
al v the Netherlands, Comm No 273/1989, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44/40 (1989
) 286 
(inadmissible); J H v Finland, Comm No 300/1988, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N44
/40 
(1989) 298 (inadmissible); RM v Finland, Comm No 301/1988, GAOR, 44th Sess, Supp No 40, UN 
Doc 
N44/40 (1989) 300 (inadmissible); van Meurs v the Netherlands, Comm No 215/1986, GAOR, 45th S
ess, 
Supp No 40, UN Doc N45/40 (1990) Vo! 2, 55; Guesdon v France, Comm No 219/1986, GAOR
, 45th 
Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N45/40 (1990) Vol 2, 61; Cadoret & Le Bihan v France, Comm Nos 221
/1987 
and 323/1988, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N46/40 (1991) 219; Sawyers, M & D Mc
Lean v 
Jamaica, Comm Nos 226/1987 and 256/1987, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40 (1991) 226 (inadmiss
ible); D 
S v Jamaica, Comm No 234/1987, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N46/40 (1991) 267 
(inadmissible); Reynolds v Jamaica, Comm No 229/1987, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N4
6/40 
(1991) 235; D S v Jamaica, Comm No 304/1988, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N46/40 (19
91) 
281 (inadmissible); Z P v Canada, Comm No 341/1988, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc 
N46/40 
(1991) 297 (inadmissible); Barzhigv France, Comm No 327/1988, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40, U
n Doc 
N46/40 (1991) 262; M Tv Spain, Comm No 310/1988, GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc N
46/40 
(1991) 284 (inadmissible). 
9 GAOR, 39th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/39/40 (1984) 143. 
10 Above n 8, Morael. 
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such as equality of arms, respect for the principle of adversary 
proceedings, preclusion of ex officio reformatio in pejus,[1
11 and 
e editious procedure.12 
Moreover, in Gilboa de Reverdito v Uruguay13 it was emphasised that 
. . . procedural guarantees for a "fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal" must be scrupulously 
observed.14 
However, apart from these statements of principle and some other brief 
comments concerning the concept of "rights and obligations in a suit at law",
15 
the Human Rights Committee is yet to articulate a detailed interpretation of 
Article 14(1). Its practice, to date, does not provide clear answers to the many 
issues of interpretation arising under the Article. In the absence of clear 
directions from the Human Rights Committee, the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights under Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention assumes, it is suggested, a position of great importance. The 
jurisprudence of the European Court is directly relevant to the proper 
interpretation of Article 14(1) of the Covenant. How can that be so? 
The wording of Article 6(1) of the European Convention is strikingly similar 
to that of Article 14(1) of the Covenant . The relevant part of Article 6(1) 
reads: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and ~blic 
hearing within a reasonable time by an ind~ndent and impartial 
tribunal estaolished by ~aw .... - . 
This similarity is no coincidence. It must be appreciated that the drafters of 
Article 6 of the European Convention in their second draft literally 
11 Ex officio correction worsening an earlier verdict. 
12 Above n 8, Morael, 219, para 9.3. 
13 Above n 8, Gilboa de Reverdito. 
14 Above n 8, Gilboa de Reverdito, 131, para 7.2. 
15 See below, text accompanying n 19. 
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reproduced the text of an earlier draft of Article 14 of the Covenant.16 The 
French text was ultimately adopted without alteration. In the English text, 
however, "rights and obligations in a suit at law" was changed, at the eleventh 
hour, into "civil rights and obligations". It appears that the drafters of Article 
6(1) abandoned the Article 14(1) formulation only because "civil rights and 
obligations" was thought to be a better translation of the French text, and not 
because a change in meaning was intended.17 There is a strong argument, 
therefore, that both provisions lay down an identical obligation. In any event, 
the close nexus between articles 14 and 6 is unmistakable. 
Apart from the close connection between the texts of articles 14(1) and 6(1), 
there is another, even more compelling reason for referring to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court when interpreting Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant. The Human Rights Committee itself has clearly implied that the 
jurisprudence of the European Court is of central importance to the proper 
interpretation of Article 14(1). That the Committee holds this view emerges 
from a passage in Y L v Canada, 18 where the Committee made the following 
16 Doc CM/WP 1 (50) 2; A 915; Collected Edition of the "Travaux Prtparatoires" of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976) Vol 3, 284-285. 
17 The French text of articles 6(1) and 14(1) is identical: both articles read "droits et obligations de caractere 
civif'. See P van Dijk 'The interpretation of "civil rights and obligations" by the European Court of Human 
Rights - one more step to take" in F Matscher and H Petzold eds, Protecting Human Rights: The European 
Dimension. Studies in honour of G J Wiarda (2ed, Carl Heymanns Verlag K G, Koln, 1990) 131, 138 
(footnote omitted): 
In the French text of Article 6, in fact, the (Article 14] formula was adopted without any change. 
In the English text "rights and obligations in a suit at law'' was altered, at the very last stage of 
the drafting, into "civil rights and obligations". The reason for this is not traceable, but one may 
assume that "suit at law" was not the obvious equivalent of "de caractere civif' in the eyes of 
continental lawyers ( and of the linguists involved). 
See also J E S Fawcett T11e Application of the European Convention on Human Rights (2ed, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1987) 127-128; P van Dijk and G J H van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2ed, Luwer, Deventer, 1990) 298-299; D J Harris 'The Application of 
Article 6 (I) of the European Convention on Human Rights to Administrative Law" (1974) 47 BYIL 157, 
176-179; and J B Elkind and A Shaw A Standard for Justice (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986) 134. 
18 Above n 8, Y L v Canada. 
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comment in relation to the meaning of the words "rights and obligations in a 
suit at law": 
In the view of the Committee the concept of a "suit at law" or its 
equivalent in the other language texts is based on the nature of the 
right in question rather than on the status of one of the parties 
(governmental, parastatal or autonomous statutory entities), or else on 
the particular forum in which individual legal systems may provide that 
the right in question is to be adjudicated upon .... 19 
Anyone who has studied the jurisprudence of the European Court under 
Article 6(1) could not help but recognise the influence of the Court's 
jurisprudence upon the Committee's reasoning in this passage. The 
European Court has consistently held that, in determining whether rights and 
obligations are "civil" rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6(1), 
only the nature of the rights and obligations is relevant; and that the character 
of the parties to the proceedings, and of the body which is invested with 
jurisdiction to determine the dispute, is of little consequence.20 In this passage 
the Committee is adopting those same criteria as a test for determining 
whether rights and obligations are rights and obligations "in a suit at law" 
within the meaning of Article 14(1) of the Covenant. This cannot be 
coincidental. It is clear, it is suggested, that the European Court's 
jurisprudence is informing the Committee's interpretation of Article 14(1). 
The influence of the European Court's jurisprudence is also visible in the 
Committee's General Comment on Article 14(1). In one passage the 
Committee advises the States Parties to the Covenant that: 
. . . States parties should specify [in their reports] the relevant 
constitutional and legislative texts which ... ensure that [the courts] are 
,,,. N-~ inde,2end~nt, i1B.µgrti~l and CO_!!lQetent, ~n particular with_r_e~~d to the 
r<>tl C~ILOll.(iv manner m which Judges are ap.e2mted, the quahflcat10ns for 
- R ILH 11RO.> appointment, and the duration of the1r terms of office; the conditions 
_ WAQ D governing promotion, transfer and cessation of their functions and the 
\I\) ~ u _ actual independence of the judiciary from the executive branch and the 
~, Pt legislature.~1 
C ~ E E 0 \.Aj\ 1 CE C E vJ ()fil'- 1 ju 0"'"'( \ '111 1 -S uttL c: e-i l c~" f ert"lO . ) 
19 
20 
21 
Above n 8, Y L v Canada, 148, para 9.2 
See below, text accompanying n 75. 
Above n 9, 143-144, para 3. 
\\· ~ - Nof ~C:.e j\.'1<: I 
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Again, the European resonances are unmistakable. The manner in which 
judges are appointed and the duration of their terms of office are key 
reference points for the concepts of independence and impartiality under 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention.22 Moreover, the European Court 
also attaches great importance to the requirement that judges be independent 
from the executive, as well as from the parties to the proceedings. 
23 This 
provides further indication that the Human Rights Committee considers the 
European jurisprudence to be of central importance to the proper 
interpretation of Article 14(1) of the Covenant. 
Moreover, a significant development has been the preparation of a 
preliminary draft declaration on the "Right to a fair trial and a remedy" by 
Messrs Chernichenko and Treat,24 special rapporteurs appointed by the 
United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities.25 The draft declaration's principal provision, which 
proclaims, inter alia, the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination 
of a person's "rights and obligations in a suit at law", is a near-replica of 
Article 14(1) of the Covenant.26 Significantly, in clarifying and elaborating 
upon the content of that provision, the draft declaration unmistakably draws 
upon the wording of Article 6(1) of the European Convention and the 
22 See below, text accompanying nn 216-226. 
23 See below, text accompanying nn 214-234. 
24 "Draft declaration on the right to a fair trial and a remedy", UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/1993/24/Add 1 (2
5 
June 1993). 
25 Messrs Chemichenko and Treat were appointed "to prepare a brief report on existing internation
al 
standards pertaining to the right to a fair trial" and to recommend ''which provisions guaranteeing the right 
to a fair trial should be made non-derogable": see brief preparatory report, UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 
2/1990/34, 1, para 1. See also their preliminary report, UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/1991/29; and progress 
reports, UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/1992/24 and Add 1-3 and E/CN 4/Sub 2/1993/24 and Add 1-2. 
26 The material part of the provision provides: 
In the determination of any criminal charge against a person, or of the person's rights and 
obligations in a suit at Jaw, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by Jaw .. . .. 
Above n 24, 6, para 1. 
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jurisprudence of the European Court. For example, the terms "rights and 
obligations in a suit at law" and "civil rights and obligations" are used 
interchangeably; in defining "rights and obligations in a suit at law", the draft 
declaration states that "[p ]roceedings as to civil rights and obligations do not 
require that both parties to the proceedings be private persons".27 The special 
rapporteurs have clearly used both the wording of Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention and the case-law of the European Court as reference 
points in defining a term drawn directly from Article 14(1) of the Covenant. 
The preliminary draft declaration provides further evidence of the close 
relationship between Article 14(1) of the Covenant and Article 6(1) of the 
Convention; and it supports the view that the jurisprudence of the European 
Court is of central importance to the proper interpretation of Article 14(1). 
Accordingly, in the absence of clear directions from the Human Rights 
Committee, it is necessary and appropriate to draw upon the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention when interpreting Article 14(1) of the Covenant. The Court's 
jurisprudence is relevant, not only because of the close nexus between the 
articles as reflected in the drafting history of Article 6(1), but also because the 
Human Rights Committee itself has clearly indicated that the jurisprudence is 
of central importance. 
As will be seen, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
under Article 6(1) of the European Convention is an invaluable guide to the 
meaning of Article 14(1) of the Covenant. In the light of that jurisprudence, 
the following conclusions may be drawn as to the meaning and acope of 
Article 14(1) of the Covenant. 
27 Above n 24, 21, para 74(b)(ii). 
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(a) Article 14(1) applies whenever a dispute arises in respect of a 
person's "rights and obligations in a suit at law".28 
(b) These must be rights and obligations "which can be said, at least 
on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law".29 
(c) Article 14(1) may apply to disputes arising in respect of either 
an interference with an existing right, the scope of an existing 
right, the mode of exercise of an existing right, or whether a 
right actually exists.30 
( d) The concept of "rights and obligations in a suit at law" in Article 
14(1) of the Covenant may be equated with the concept of "civil 
rights and obligations" in Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention. 31 
( e) The concept of "rights and obligations in a suit at law" must be 
given an autonomous meaning. This means that it must be 
interpreted independently of the domestic law of any particular 
State Party to the Covenant. The concept of "rights and 
obligations in a suit at law" includes, but is not limited to, 
"private" rights and obligations.32 
(f) In determining whether rights and obligations are rights and 
obligations "in a suit at law", only the nature of the rights is 
relevant. The character of the domestic law which governs the 
dispute, of the authority which has jurisdiction to determine the 
dispute, and of the parties to the dispute, is of little or no 
consequence. 33 
28 See below, text accompanying nn 39-40. 
29 See below, text accompanying n 41. 
30 See below, text accompanying n 42. 
31 See discussion above, text accompanying nn 16-17. 
32 See below, text accompanying nn 73-74. 
33 See below, text accompanying nn 75. 
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(g) Whenever a dispute arises in respect of a person's "rights and 
obligations in a suit at law", that person has a right under Article 
14(1) to submit the dispute for determination to a tribunal 
which meets the various requirements of the Article. Article 
14(1) guarantees not only a fair hearing in proceedings which 
are already pending, but also a right of access to a tribunal in 
order to bring proceedings in the first place.34 
(h) The tribunal need not be a "court of the classic kind". The 
concept of a "tribunal" in the substantive sense of the term 
denotes bodies which exhibit common fundamental features, 
namely: 
independence of the executive; 
independence of the parties to the dispute; 
adequate duration of members' term of office; 
and 
proceedings which afford the necessary 
guarantees. 35 
(i) The "independence" of the tribunal must be assessed by 
reference to four criteria, namely: 
the manner of appointment of its members; 
the duration of its members' term of office; 
the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressures; and 
whether the body presents the appearance of 
independence. 36 
34 See below, text accompanying nn 111-188. 
35 See below, text accompanying nn 189-213. 
36 See below, text accompanying nn 214-234 
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(j) The "impartiality" of a tribunal is assessed both subjectively and 
objectively. As regards subjective impartiality, the personal 
impartiality of the members of the tribunal is presumed until 
the contrary is proved. In assessing objective impartiality, it is 
necessary to take into account whether there is an appearance 
of impartiality and the internal organisation of the tribunal.37 
In order to explain these conclusions more fully, a careful analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court under Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention is required.38 
37 See below, text accompanying nn 235-248. 
38 Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) 1 EHRR 455; De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgiwn 1 EHRR 373; Golder v 
United Kingdom 1 EHRR 524; Wmterwerp v the Netherlands 2 EHRR 387; Airey v Ireland 2 EHRR 305; 
Konig v Federal Republic of Germany 2 EHRR 170; Buchholz v Federal Republic of Germany (1981) 3 
EHRR 597; Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgiwn (1982) 4 EHRR 1; Spo"ong and Lonnroth v 
Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35; Silverv United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 341;AlbenandLe Comptev Belgiwn 
(1983) 5 EHRR 533; Zimmerman and Steiner v Switzerland (1984) 6 EHRR 17; Pretto v Italy (1984) 6 
EHRR 182; Axen v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 195; Ozturk v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 409; Sramek v 
Austria (1985) 7 EHRR; Rasmussen v Denmark (1985) 1 EHRR 371; Guincho v Portugal (1985) 7 EHRR 
223; Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 165; James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 
123; Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329; Feldbrugge v the Netherlands (1986) 8 
EHRR 425; Deumeland v Germany (1986) 8 EHRR 448; Benthem v the Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 1; 
Lechner and Hess v Austria (1987) 9 EHRR 490; Erkner and Hofauer v Austria (1987) 9 EHRR 464; Wv 
United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 29; R v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 74; 0 v United Kingdom 
(1988) 10 EHRR 82; H v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 95; B v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 87; 
Pudas v Sweden (1988) 10 EHRR 380; Poiss v Austria (1988) 10 EHRR 231; H v Belgiwn (1988) 10 
EHRR 339; Ettlv Austria (1988) 10 EHRR 255; Boden v Sweden (1988) 10 EHRR 367; Olsson v Sweden 
(1989) 11 EHRR 259; Gil/ow v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 335; Bockv Germany (1990) 12 EHRR 
247; Langborger v Sweden (1990) 12 EHRR 416; Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 
355; Eriksson v Sweden (1990) 12 EHRR 183; Uni6n Alimentaria Sanders SA v Spain (1990) 12 EHRR 24; 
Hv France (1990) 12 EHRR 14;Allan lacobsson v Sweden (1990) 12 EHRR 56; Mats Jacobsson v Sweden 
(1991) 13 EHRR 79; Manins Moreira v Portugal (1991) 13 EHRR 517; Skiirbyv Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 
90; Obermeier v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 290; Vemillo v France (1991) 13 EHRR 880; Tre Traktorer 
Aktiebolag v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 309; Phi/is v Greece (1991) 13 EHRR 741; Moreira de Azevedo v 
Portugal (1991) 13 EHRR 721; Hakansson and Sturesson v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 1; Fredin v Sweden 
(1991) 13 EHRR 784; Capuano v Italy (1991) 13 EHRR 271; Baraona v Portugal (1991) 13 EHRR 329; 
Santilli v Italy (1992) 14 EHRR 421; Xv France (1992) 14 EHRR 483; Editions Periscope v France (1992) 
14 EHRR 597; Tomasi v France (1992) 14 EHRR l; Oerlemans v the Netherlands (1993) 15 EHRR 561; 
Helmers v Sweden Unreported, 29 Oct 1991, 22/1990/213/275; Wiesinger v Austria Unreported, 30 Oct 
1991, 38/1990/229/295; Brigand/ case Unreported, 19 Feb 1991, 2/1990/193/253; Zanghi case Unreported, 
19 Feb 91, 3/1990/194/254; Vocaturo v Italy Unreported, 24 May 1991, 8/1990/219/281; Caleffi v Italy 
Unreported,24 May 1991, 27/1990/218/280; Pugliese v Italy (No 2) Unreported, 24 May 1991, 
25/1990/216/278; Cesarini v Italy Unreported,, 12 Oct 1992, 77/1991/329/402; Salemo v Italy Unreported, 
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B Article 6( 1) of the European Convention 
1 "rights and obligations" 
Article 6(1) provides that, "[i]n the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations", everyone is entitled to a fair and pub]ic hearing by a tribunal 
which meets the various requirements of the Article. This presupposes that a 
dispute39 has arisen, and that the subject-matter of the dispute concerns a 
person's "rights" and "obligations".40 It is important to consider, therefore, 
what is meant by the concept of "rights and obligations", since.the guarantees 
of Article 6(1) will not apply if the subject-matter of the dispute does not 
concern "rights and obligations". Significantly, the European Court of Human 
Rights has consistently held that Article 6(1) extends only to disputes over 
rights and obligations "which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be 
recognised under domestic law".41 Accordingly, the concept of "rights and 
obligations" denotes rights and obligations which arguably exist under the 
domestic law of the State Party concerned. This principle has two important 
implications. 
First, it means that Article 6(1) may apply to disputes in which it is the actual 
existence of a right which is at stake, as well as to disputes in which either an 
interference with an existing right, or the scope or manner of exercise of an 
12 Oct 1992, 84/1991/336/409; Giancarlo Lombardo v Italy Unreported, 26 Nov 1992, 85/1991/337/410; 
Francesco Lombardo v Italy Unreported, 26 Nov 1992, 76/1991/328/401; de Geouffre de la Pradelle v France 
Unreported, 16 Dec 1992, 87/1991/339/412; Salesi v Italy Unreported, 2 Feb 1993, 11/1992/356/430; 
Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland Unreported, 24 June 1993, 17/1992/362/436. 
39 The concept of "dispute" is interpreted in a broad sense; a difference of opinion between the parties is 
sufficient, provided that it is "genuine and of a serious nature": above n 38, Benthem, 8, para 33. 
40 The rights and obligations must also be "civil" in character if Article 6(1) is to apply. The meaning of the 
word "civil" in the context of Article 6(1) is discussed below, text accompanying nn 68-110. 
41 See, for example, above n 38,lames, 157, para 81. 
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existing right, is at stake.42 Where a dispute arises as to whether a right exists, 
and the person asserting the existence of the right makes out an arguable case 
that the right does indeed exist, Article 6(1) is triggered,43 with the result that 
the person asserting the right's existence is then entitled to have the dispute 
determined by a tribunal which meets the various requirements of Article 
6(1). This point may be illustrated by comparing two scenarios. Suppose, in 
our first scenario, that a doctor's practising certificate is revoked by the 
relevant professional authority, with the result that the doctor is precluded 
from practising the medical profession. The doctor challenges the revocation 
on the basis that, for example, it was unlawful. In this scenario, the doctor has 
a right, pursuant to his certificate, to practise the medical profession. 
Whether the doctor has a right to practise the medical profession is, 
accordingly, not at issue; what is at issue is whether the alleged interference 
with his right was lawful. There is clearly a dispute in respect of a right "which 
can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic 
law".44 Indeed, it is unarguable that the doctor has the right to practise. 
Accordingly, Article 6(1) applies: the dispute as to whether the interference 
with his right was lawful must be determined by a tribunal which meets the 
various requirements of the Article. 
Now consider a second scenario. Suppose an uncertified doctor applies to the 
professional authority for a practising certificate, and the authority refuses to 
give him one. In this scenario the dispute does not relate to an alleged 
interference with the doctor's right to practise. The dispute relates to whether 
or not such a right actually exists. The doctor is asserting that he has the right 
42 See, for example, above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 16, para 44; above n 38, Benthem, 8, 
para 32. 
43 Providing that all other requirements of Article 6( l) are satisfied; for example, the right whose existence is 
in dispute must be "civil" in character: see discussion below, text accompanying nn 68-110. 
44 See, for example, above n 38, James, 157, para 81. 
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to a practising certificate. Article 6(1) is applicable to this dispute also, 
provided that the doctor makes out an arguable case that he has a right to 
practise. In order to make out such a case, he will need to show that he 
arguably fulfils the criteria on the basis of which the authority will decide 
whether or not to grant him a practising certificate. If the doctor is able to 
make out an arguable case, Article 6(1) will be triggered, and he will be 
entitled to have the dispute determined by a tribunal which meets the various 
requirements of the Article. Accordingly, Article 6(1) draws no distinction 
between disputes where it is the actual existence of a right which is at stake, 
and disputes where it is an interference with an existing right, or the scope or 
manner of exercise of an existing right, which is at issue. Both types of dispute 
are treated as disputes in respect of "rights", with the result that, in each case, 
the guarantees of Article 6(1) apply. 
Thus in Hakansson and Sturesson v Sweden45, where the applicants had been 
refused a statutory permit to retain their property, the Court held that a 
"right" was at stake in the ensuing dispute, since it was "quite clear that the 
applicants considered themselves entitled, under the relevant statutory 
provisions, to the grant of the necessary permit".46 In Neves e Silva v 
Portugal,47 moreover, the Court concluded that the applicant had mounted a 
"sufficiently tenable" argument that he had a right under the relevant 
legislation to compensation for culpable conduct on the part of the 
administrative authorities.48 In both cases, therefore, the respective 
applicants were entitled under Article 6(1) to have the dispute concerning the 
existence of the right determined by a tribunal meeting the various 
45 Above n 38, Hakansson and Sturesson. 
46 Above n 38, Hakansson and Sturesson, 15, para 60. 
47 Above n 38, Neves e Silva. 
48 Above n 38, Neves e Silva, 542, para 37. 
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requirements of the Article. This was because the rights could "be said, at 
least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law".49 
What is the position, however, where the asserted right is said to derive from a 
statutory provision which confers a wide discretion with few or no express 
criteria to guide the decision-maker? Suppose a statutory provision 
empowers a minister to grant social welfare benefits "to such persons as he or 
she thinks fit". Could a prospective beneficiary claim on the basis of this 
provision that he or she has a right, at least on arguable grounds, to receive a 
benefit? Some may argue that it is a nonsense to speak of "rights" in this 
context, since the receipt of a benefit depends entirely upon the subjective 
choice of the decision-maker. Given that there are no objective criteria to 
which the exercise of the discretion can be tied down, how can any prospective 
benficiary make out an arguable case that he or she meets the criteria on 
which the decision to grant a benefit is based? The European Court of 
Human Rights has refused to accept, however, that an arguable right cannot 
derive from a discretionary power. In Allan Jacobsson v Sweden,50 for 
example, it was held that the applicant could arguably have claimed a "right" 
to a building permit despite the discretion left by the Swedish Parliament to 
the administrative authorities. Dismissing the Government's argument that 
the applicant could not claim any "right" to build before a permit had been 
granted,51 the Court noted: 
True, the issue of a permit under these circumstances would have 
involved the exercise of a certain discretion by the authorities, but their 
discretion would not have been unfettered: they would have been 
bound by generally recognised legal and administrative principles.52 
49 See, for example, above n 38, James, 157, para 81. 
50 Above n 38, Allan Jacobsson. 
51 Above n 38,Allan Jacobsson, 70, para 69. 
52 Above n 38, Allan Jacobsson , 70, para 69. See also above n 38, Pudas, 388, para 34; above n 38, Mats 
Jacobsson , 85, para 32; above n 38, Skiirby, 94, para 20; above n 38, Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag, 319, paras 39-
40; above n 38, Htikansson and Sturesson, 15, para 60. 
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In view of the reasoning in this passage it is difficult to conceive of a discretion 
which could be regarded as unfettered, since all decision-makers are "bound 
by generally recognised legal and administrative principles", such as the duty 
to act fairly, reasonably and according to law.53 The Court's approach, it is 
suggested, is surely correct, because it ensures that there is no incentive for 
national legislatures to confer wide, open-ended discretions in order to evade 
the requirements of Article 6(1).54 
A second implication of the principle that Article 6(1) extends only to disputes 
over rights and obligations "which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to 
be recognised under domestic law" is that a State is able, without violating 
Article 6(1), to decide not or no longer to recognise a certain right in its 
domestic law, with a view to excluding the operation of the Article. This is 
illustrated by James v United Kingdom.55 In that case, the applicant landlords 
had been deprived of the ownership of their properties through the exercise 
by their tenants of rights of acquisition conferred by the Leasehold Reform 
Act 1967. The applicants argued that there had been a breach of Article 6(1), 
in that there had been no opportunity to challenge the tenants' rights of 
acquisition on the basis of hardship or individual merits. However, in the 
Court's view, in so far as there had been compliance with the 1967 Act, there 
were no grounds on which the applicants could argue that they had a right 
under English law to retain their properties. This was because, in so far as 
there had been compliance with the 1967 Act, any such right had been 
extinguished.56 Accordingly, apart from cases where non-compliance with the 
53 See Council of Civil Service Unionsv Minister for Civil Service (1985) 1 AC 374, 410-411. 
54 See above n 17, P van Dijk and G J H van Hoof, 301. 
55 Above n 38,James. 
56 By contrast, Article 6(1) did apply to any dispute in which the applicants alleged non-compliance with the 
1967 Act, because it could be said on arguable grounds that the applicants had a right to retain their 
properties in so far as there was non-compliance with the Act: above n 38, James, 157-158, paras 81-82; 
and see the discussion below, text accompanying nn 143-146. 
21 
1967 Act could be alleged, there was no right which could be said, on arguable 
grounds, to exist in the law of the United Kingdom.57 
This aspect of the Court's interpretation of the concept of "civil rights and 
obligations" is controversial,58 because it is inconsistent with the principle, 
well-esatblished in the Court's case law, that the concept of "civil rights and 
obligations" must be given an autonomous meaning which is independent of 
the domestic law of the State Party concerned.59 The result is that the 
applicability of Article 6(1) in relation to the same factual situation may vary 
from one State to another, depending upon the classifications adopted in the 
respective domestic legal systems. Moreover, the Court's interpretation 
creates an incentive for States to change their domestic law in order to avoid 
the need for a "fair hearing" to be given in a certain field.60 
The boundary line between arguable and non-arguable rights may be obscure 
in some circumstances. This problem arose in Ashingdane v United 
Kingdom.61 There, the applicant claimed that he had an arguable right to 
hospital accomodation under the National Health Service Act 1977, section 3 
of which imposed a duty on the Secretary of State for Social Services to 
57 The Court justified its approach on the basis that Article 6(1) did not in itself "guarantee any particular 
content" for civil rights and obligations in the substantive law of the States Parties to the Convention. This 
analysis was confirmed, in the Court's view, by the fact that "Article 6(1) does not require that there be a 
national court with competence to invalidate or override domestic law": above n 38, James, 157-158, para 
81. See also above n 38, Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom, 365-366, paras 34-35. 
58 Above n 38, Ashingdane, 548-549 (Concurring Opinion of Judge Lagergren). See further above n 38, W v 
United Kingdom, 59-60 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Lagergren, Pinheiro Farinha, Pettiti, 
MacDonald, De Meyer and Valticos); above n 38, Lithgow, 400-401 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges 
Lagergren and MacDonald). See also above n 38, Golder, 535-536, 34-36; above n 38, Ozturk, 420-421, 
para 49. 
59 See below, text accompanying 73-74. 
60 Compare above n 38, W v United Kingdom, above n 38, R v United Kingdom, above n 38, 0 v United 
Kingdom, above n 38, B v United Kingdom and above n 38, H v United Kingdom, where the Court held that 
a parental right of access to his or her child could not have been extinguished altogether by a care order, 
especially in light of the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention: 
above n 38, Wv United Kingdom, 54-56, paras 74-77. 
61 Above n 38,Ashingdane. 
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provide hospital accomodation "to such an extent as he considers necessary to 
meet all reasonable requirements".62 Because it was able to dispose of the 
case on other grounds,63 the Court assumed without deciding that "a right 
[was] conferred on the individual citizen by section 3".64 The Court hinted, 
however, that it seriously doubted whether such a right even arguably existed 
under English law. This doubt was implicit in the Court's reference to the 
action for breach of statutory duty in the English law of torts; the Court noted 
that the action was available only "if the statute created in the individual 
concerned an interest which was intended by Parliament to be protected by an 
action in tort".65 It was debatable whether section 3 of the 1977 Act created 
such an interest. Ashingdane provides a further illustration of the principle 
that Article 6(1) extends only to disputes over rights and obligations "which 
can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic 
law".66 Article 6(1) could be applicable only if a right to hospital 
accomodation arguably existed in English law; the only possible source of such 
a right was the English law of torts, which was obscure on that point.67 
2 "civil" rights and obligations 
It is a further requirement of Article 6(1) that the rights and obligations in 
respect of which the dispute arises must be "civil" in character.68 What, then, 
is meant by the term "civil" in the context of Article 6(1)? Although the Court 
has refrained, to date, from giving an abstract definition of the concept of 
62 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 536, para 25. 
63 See below nn 163-178 and accompanying text. 
64 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 547, para 59 (footnote omitted). 
65 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 538, para 30. 
66 See, for example, above n 38,James, 157, para 81. 
67 See also above n 38, Moreira de Azevedo, 737, para 67; above n 38, Baraona, 339, para 41. 
68 See, for example, above n 38, Benthem, 9, para 34. 
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"civil rights and obligations",69 it has tended to equate "civil rights and 
obligations" with "private rights and obligations", as opposed to "public rights 
and obligations".70 This public-private distinction is highly problematic. It has 
meant that, for example, employment in the public service is regarded as a 
"public" right and is not accorded protection under Article 6(1),71 whereas 
employment in a private business is treated as a "private" right and, therefore, 
is accorded such protection.72 From the employee's perspective, such a 
distinction is plainly arbitrary: both types of employee have important 
interests at stake, such as career prospects and livelihood, which logically 
should enjoy equal protection. In view of the manifest arbitrariness of the 
public-private distinction, it comes as no surprise that the Court has 
increasingly tended to blur it. As will be seen, the range of rights which may 
be regarded as "civil" rights within the meaning of Article 6(1) is continuing to 
expand. 
It is well-established that the concept of "civil rights and obligations" is an 
autonomous73 concept which must be interpreted independently of any formal 
69 See above n 38, Feldbrugge, 431 , para 27; above n 38, Deumeland, 463, para 61 ; and above n 38, Benthem, 9, 
para 35. 
70 The Court has consistently held that the phrase "determination of his civil rights and obligations" 
("contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractere civif') covers "all proceedings the result of which is 
decisive for private rights and obligations": see above n 38, Ringeisen (No 1) , 490, para 94; above n 38, 
Konig, 193, para 90; above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 16, para 44; above n 38,Albert and 
Le Compte, 541, para 28(b); above n 38, Feldbrugge, 431, para 27; above n 38, Deumeland, 462, para 60; 
above n 38, Benthem, 9, para 34; above n 38, Pudas, 388, para 35; above n 38, Baraona, 339, para 42. The 
Court has not ruled out the possibility, however, that the concept of "civil rights" may extend beyond those 
rights which have a private nature: above n 38, Konig, 195, para 95. 
71 See, for example, App No 8496/79 v United Kingdom (1981) D & R 168 (European Commission of Human 
Rights); see also the authorities listed in above n 17, van Dijk and van Hoof, 2ed, n 487 at p 303. 
72 See above n 38, Buchholz; above n 38, Obermeier, and above n 38, Cesarini. 
73 The principle of autonomy ensures that "the object and purpose of the Convention" is not compromised: 
above n 38, Konig, 193, para 88. See also W J Ganshof van der Meersch "Le caract~re «autonome» des 
terms et la «marge d'appr~ciation» des gouvemements dans l'interpr~tation de la Convention eu~ene 
des Droits de !'Homme" in F Matscher and H Petzold eds, Protecting Hwnan Rights: The European 
Dimension. Studies in honour of G J Wiarda (2ed, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Koln, 1990) 201. 
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classifications in national legal systems.74 This means that "[t]he character of 
the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined ... and that 
of the authority which is invested with jurisdiction in the matter ... are ... of 
little consequence".75 Moreover, it is not necessary that both parties to the 
proceedings be private persons; the Court has stated that, "[i]f the case 
concerns a dispute between an individual and a public authority, whether the 
latter has acted as a private person or in its sovereign capacity is ... not 
conclusive".76 Nor is a right's "civil" character altered because regulation of it 
is desirable in the "public interest".77 It follows that, in ascertaining whether a 
right is a "civil" right within the meaning of Article 6(1), "only the character of 
the right ... is relevant".78 
74 Othetwise, a State Party could bypass Article 6(l)'s requirements simply by altering the legal classification 
of the right in its domestic law; and that is a result which the principle of autonomy is designed to avoid. 
See above n '38, Ringeisen (No 1), 490, para 94; above n '38, Konig, 192-193, para 88; above n '38, Fe/dbrugge, 
431, para 27; above n 38, Deumeland, 462, para 60; above n '38, Benthem, 9, para 34; above n '38, Ptulas, 
388, para 35; above n '38, Baraona, 339, para 42; and above n '38, Xv France, 502-503, para 30. In Konig the 
Court also mentioned that it was required also to "take account of the object and purpose of the 
Convention and of the national legal systems of the other Contracting States": above n '38, Konig, 193, para 
89. See also above n '38, Feldbrugge, 432, para 29; above n '38, Dewneland, 463, para 63. 
75 Above n 38, Ringeisen (No 1), 490, para 94; above n '38, Konig, 194, para 92, 195, para 94; above n '38, Le 
Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 16, para 44; above n '38, Spo"ong and Lonnroth, 56, para 80; above n 
'38, Albert and Le Compte, 541, para 28(b); above n '38, Fe/dbrugge, 431, para 27; above n '38, Dewneland, 
462-463, para 60; above n '38, Bell/hem, 9, para 34; above n '38, Pudas, 388-'389, paras 35-36; above n '38, H 
v Belgium, 348-349, paras 46-47; above n '38, Allan Jacobsson, 71, para 73; above n '38, Baraona, 340, para 
43; above n '38, Xv France, 502-503, para 30; above n '38, Editions nriscope, 613, para 40; above n '38, 
Tomasi, 57-58, para 121. Compare above n 38, Rasmussen, 377-378, para 32; above n '38, Salesi, 20, para 
39. 
76 Above n '38, Konig, 194, para 90. See also above n '38, Ringeisen (No 1), 490, para 94; above n '38, Le 
Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 16, para 44; above n '38, Albert and Le Compte, 541, para 28(b); above 
n '38, Feldbrugge, 431, para 27; above n '38, Dewneland, 462-463, para 60; above n '38, Benthem, 9, para 34; 
above n 38, Pudas, 388-'389, paras 35-36; above n '38, above n '38, H v France, 87-88, para 47; above n '38, 
Baraona, 340, para 43; above n '38, Giancarlo Lombardo, 6, para 16; above n '38, Francesco Lombardo, 6-7, 
paras 14-17. 
77 Above n '38, Konig, 194, para 92; above n '38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 18, para 48; above n 
'38, Alben and Le Compte, 541, para 28(b); above n '38, Rasmussen, 377-378, para 32; above n '38, H v 
Belgium, 349, para 47; above n '38, Allan Jacobsson, 71, para 73; above n '38, Mats Jacobsson, 87, para 34; 
above n '38, Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag, 320-321, paras 42-43. 
78 Above n '38, Konig, 194, para 90; above n '38, Feldbrugge, 431, para 27; above n '38, Dewneland, 462-463, 
para 60; and above n 38,Benthem, 9, para 34. 
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In the light of these guiding principles the Court has held "civil" rights to 
include certain categories of rights, the two most important of which are rights 
of property, 79 and the right to pursue a business, profession or other private 
occupation. 80 The ownership, use and enjoyment of property is clearly a right 
of a private and, therefore, civil nature, while the right to pursue a business, 
profession or other private occupation owes its "civil" character to its 
commercial component, as Konig illustrates. In that case, which concerned 
the right to run a private medical clinic, the Court attached importance to the 
fact that the running of a clinic was in certain respects a commercial activity, 
carried on through the conclusion of contracts between the clinic and its 
patients and with a view to profit; in the Court's view, this activity resembled 
"the exercise of a private right in some ways akin to the right of property".81 
The right to run a clinic was, accordingly, a civil right within the meaning of 
Article 6(1).82 "Civil" rights have also been held to include parental and other 
family rights,83 the right to protect one's reputation,84 and the right to join a 
79 Above n 38,Ringeisen (No 1) vAustria (contract for sale of land); above n 38, Winterwe,p (mental patient's 
right to deal with property); above n 38, Spo"ong and Lonnroth (expropriation of and construction on 
property); above n 38, Zimmerman and Steiner; above n 38, Sramek (contract for sale of land); above n 38, 
James (acquisition by tenants of landlords' property); above n 38, Lithgow (compulsory acquisition of 
shares); above n 38, Benthem (license to operate gas installation); above n 38, Erkner and Hofauer (land 
consolidation proceedings); above n 38, Poiss (land consolidation proceedings); above n 38, Ettl 
(proceedings affecting land); above n 38, Boden (expropriation permit); above n 38, Gillow (occupation of 
home); above n 38, Allan Jacobsson (construction on property); above n 38, Mats Jacobsson (construction 
on property); above n 38, Skiirby (construction on property); above n 38, Hakansson and Sturesson 
(retention of property); above n 38, Fredin (proposal to develop property); above n 38, Capuano 
(easement over property); above n 38, Baraona (compensation for damage to property); above n 38, 
Oerlemans (cultivation of land); above n 38, Wiesinger (consolidation proceedings); above n 38, de Geouffre 
de la Pradelle (alteration of land). 
80 Above n 38, Konig; above n 38, Buchholz; above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere; above n 38, 
Albert and Le Compte v Belgi,um; above n 38, H; above n 38, Obermeier; and above n 38, Cesarini. 
81 Above n 38,Konig. See also above n 38,Le Compte, VanLeuven and De Meyere; above n 38,Albert and Le 
Compte. 
82 Above n 38, Konig, 195, para 95. 
83 Above n 38, Airey; above n 38, Rasmussen; above n 38, W v United Kingdom; above n 38, R v United 
Kingdom; above n 38, O v United Kingdom; above n ~ . B v Unlted Kingdom; above n 38, H v United 
Kingdom; above n 38, Olsson; above n 38,Bock; above n 38, Eriksson. 
84 Above n 38, Golder; above n 38, Silver; above n 38, Helmers . 
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private pension fund.85 Furthermore, the range of rights and obligations 
protected by the law of tort and contract are also civil rights and obligations 
within the meaning of Article 6(1).86 
In recent years the Court's interpretation of the concept of "civil rights and 
obligations" has been evolving. The Court has indicated that it is prepared to 
extend the concept beyond the established categories of rights and obligations 
to include rights and obligations which have traditionally been regarded as 
"public" in character. The Court took its first steps in this direction in the 
Feldbrugge81 and Deumeland88 cases, where it accepted that social security 
rights were "civil" rights within the meaning of Article 6(1). Feldbrugge 
concerned a decision by the relevant authorities to deprive the applicant of a 
statutory sickness allowance; Deumeland, a claim by the applicant for a 
statutory widow's pension which had been sought by his mother. The Court 
acknowledged that the rights disclosed both public- and private-law features,89 
but concluded that private-law features predominated.9() In so doing the 
Court focused upon the "personal, economic and individual" nature of the 
rights, a factor which, in its view, "brought [the rights] close to the civil 
sphere".91 In Feldbrugge's case the Court noted, moreover, that the applicant 
85 Above n 38, Giancarlo Lombardo; above n 38, Francesco Lombardo. 
86 Above n 38, Pretto; above n 38,Axen; above n 38, Guincho v Ponugal; above n 38, Lechner and Hess; above 
n 38, Hv France; above n 38, Langborger; above n 38, Union Alimentaria Sanders SA; above n 38, Vernillo; 
above n 38, Martins Moreira; above n 38, Neves e Silva; above n 38, Philis; above n 38, Moreira de Azevedo; 
above n 38, Santilli; above n 38, Xv France; above n 38, Brigandl case; above n 38, Zanghl case; above n 38, 
Vocaturo; above n 38, Pugliese (No 2); above n 38, Tomasi. 
87 Above n 38, Feldbrugge. 
88 Above n 38, Deumeland. 
89 Features of public law were the character of the legislation, the compulsory nature of the insurance and the 
assumption by the State of responsibility for social protection: above n 38, Feldbrugge, 432-434, paras 31-
35; above n 38, Deumeland, 464-465, paras 65-68. Features of private law, by contrast, were the personal 
and economic nature of the asserted right, the connection with the contract of employment, and affinities 
with insurance under the ordinary law: above n 38, Feldbrugge, 434-435, paras 36-39; above n 38, 
Deumeland, 465-466, paras 70-73. 
9() Above n 38, Feldbrugge, 435, para 40; above n 38, Deumeland, 466, para 74. 
91 Above n 38, Feldbrugge, 434, para 37. 
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had "suffered an interference with her means of subsistence";92 and it 
emphasised that it was necessary to view the facts from the applicant's 
perspective: 
For the individual asserting it, [ a right flowing from legislation] is often 
of crucial importance; this is especially so in the case of health 
insurance benefits where the employee who is unable to work by 
reason of illness enjoys no other source of income.93 
Despite presenting the appearance of comparing the public- and private-law 
features of the rights in question, in reality the Court in Feldbrugge and in 
Deumeland paid only lip-service to the public-private distinction. The 
predominance of private-law features was not the decisive factor in the 
Court's decisions. Rather, the Court was responding to the jeopardy in which 
the applicants' livelihoods had been placed.94 In such circumstances, 
adequate procedural protection was mandatory; and, in order to provide it, 
the Court blurred the distinction between public and private rights. The 
decisions were undoubtedly appropriate, it is submitted, since, from the 
applicant's perspective, it is the impact upon his or her livelihood which is of 
crucial importance, not the artificial distinction between public and private 
rights.95 
92 Above n 38, Feldbrugge, 434, para 37. The Court also referred to the connection between the right to a 
sickness benefit and the contract of employment: above n 38, Feldbrugge, 434, para 38; and to the affinities 
of the statutory insurance scheme with insurance under the ordinary law: above n 38, Feldbrugge, 434--435, 
para 39. 
93 Above n 38, Feldbrugge, 434, para 37. 
94 See C Scott 'The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of 
the International Covenants on Human Rights" (1989) 27 Osg Hall LI 769, 861-862. 
95 In concluding in both Feldbrugge and Deumeland that the rights to social-insurance benefits were "civil" 
rights, the Court noted as a relevant factor that neither individual was "affected in her relations with the 
public authorities as such, acting in the exercise of discretionary powers ... ": above n 38, Feldbrugge, 434, 
para 37; above n 38, Deumeland, 465, para 71; and see also above n 38, Salesi, 20, para 19. This may 
suggest that Article 6(1) does not apply to "acts of public authorities taken in the exercise of discretionary 
powers": see A W Bradley "Social Security and the Right to a Fair Hearing: The Strasbourg Perspective" 
[1987] PL 3, 9. van Dijk criticises this aspect of the Court 's reasoning as "superfluous" and as 
irreconcilable with its judgement in the Ben them case (which did involve the exercise by a public authority 
of discretionary powers): above n 17, van Dijk, n 64 at 143. 
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Feldbmgge and Deumeland have been applied most recently in Salesi96 and in 
Schuler-Zgraggen,97 where the Court held that the right to a disability 
allowance and the right to an invalidity pension respectively were "civil" rights 
within the meaning of Article 6(1). Referring in both cases to the "principle of 
equality of treatment", the Court saw "no convincing reason" to distinguish 
between these rights and the rights to social insurance benefits asserted in 
Feldbmgge and Deumeland.98 These cases provide a strong impetus for the 
continued expansion of the categories of rights which are "civil" rights within 
the meaning of Article 6(1). The reference in Salesi and in Schuler-Zgraggen 
to the principle of equality of treatment is particularly noteworthy, because it 
means that other rights which are "personal, economic and individual" in 
nature are also likely to be regarded as "civil" rights. This would include a 
number of rights which traditionally have been regarded as "public" in 
character, such as the right to tax concessions or the right to fiscal 
advantages,99 in circumstances where such rights have direct links with the 
economic interests of the individual concerned. 
Thus in Editions Periscope v France 100 the Court hinted that the right to tax 
concessions may be a "civil" right within the meaning of Article 6(1). That 
case concerned an action by the applicant company for compensation from 
It appears, however, that the Court has abandoned this aspect of its reasoning. In the recent 
Schuler-Zgraggen case, which concerned the right to an invalidity pension, the Court justified its view that 
the right was "civil" in character by noting that "the applicant was not only affected in her relations with the 
administrative authorities as such but also suffered an interference with her means of subsistence": above n 
38, Schuler-Zgraggen, 12, para 46. This clearly implies that it makes no difference to the character of the 
right that the individual is "affected in her relations with the administrative authorities as such". 
96 Above n 38, Salesi. 
97 Above n 38, Schuler-Zgraggen . 
98 Above n 38, Salesi, 20, para 19; above n 38, Schuler-Zgraggen, 12, para 46. 
99 See above n 38, Editions Periscope, 606, para 35 (Opinion of the Commission); see also the decisions in 
App No 2552/65, 26 Col 1, 2717/66, 13 Yearbook 176 (European Commission); App No 9908/82, 32 D & 
R 266 (European Commission); App No 8903/80, 21 D & R 266 (European Commission). 
100 Above n 38, Editions Periscope. 
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the administrative authorities for damage suffered as a result of the 
authorities' refusal to grant it tax concessions and postal charge reductions. 
Admittedly, the Court was not directly required to determine whether the 
rights to tax concessions and to postal reductions were "civil" rights within the 
meaning of Article 6(1), because those rights were not in dispute; the right in 
dispute was the right to receive compensation for the damage suffered.101 
None the less, in concluding that the right to receive compensation was a 
"civil" right, the Court noted, significantly, it is suggested, that the subject 
matter of the applicant's action was "pecuniary" in nature and that "the action 
was founded on an alleged infringement of rights which were likewise pecuniary 
rights". 102 Accordingly, in the Court's view, not only was the "subject-matter" 
of the action - the right to compensation - "pecuniary" in nature; so too were 
the right to tax concessions and the right to postal reductions, whose alleged 
infringement had given rise to the action.103 Given that "pecuniary" rights 
bear all the hallmarks of "personal, economic and individual" rights, and also 
have close affinities with property rights, logic suggests that the right to tax 
concessions and the right to postal reductions would also have been regarded 
as "civil" rights had the Court been required to determine their status. 
The same emphasis upon the economic interests of the applicant is evident in 
recent cases concerning the grant and revocation of statutory licenses. In 
Benthem v the Netherlands, 104 the Court held that the right to a statutory 
license to operate a liquid petroleum gas installation was a "civil" right, since 
the grant of the license was a condition for the conduct of part of the 
applicant's business activities, the license was closely associated with his right 
to use his possessions and it had a proprietary character, as it could be 
101 Above n 38,Editions Periscope, 611-612, paras 36-37. 
102 Above n 38,Editions Periscope, 613, para 40 (emphasis added). 
103 See also above n 38, Neves e Silva. 
104 Above n 38, Benthem. 
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assigned to third parties.105 By contrast, the public-law features of the license 
were accorded less importance. The Court took a similar approach in Pudas v 
Sweden, which concerned the right to a public transport license, 106 and in Tre 
Traktorer Aktiebolag v Sweden, where the right to a license to sell alcoholic 
beverages was at issue.107 In all three cases - Benthem, Pudas and Tre 
Traktorer Aktiebolag - the Court emphasised the direct link between the grant 
of the license and the entirety of the applicant's commercial activities,1°8 a 
factor which clearly pointed, in the Court's view, to the "civil" character of the 
right.109 
The Court's interpretation of the concept of "civil rights and obligations" is 
evolving, with the result that the categories of rights which fall within the 
ambit of Article 6(1) are continuing to expand. In particular, there are strong 
indications that the distinction between public and private rights will 
ultimately be abandoned by the Court. That would be an appropriate 
development, it is submitted, because the distinction is an outmoded one 
which ignores the fundamental importance to individuals of a wide range of 
social security and other rights. A rights-centred perspective requires that 
procedural protection be given to such rights as well as to rights which have 
traditionally been regarded as "private" in character. It is only a matter of 
time, it is submitted, before the Court takes "one more step"110 and no longer 
restricts the concept of "civil rights and obligations" to "private rights and 
obligations". 
105 Above n 38, Benthem, 9, para 36. 
106 Above n 38, Pudas, 389, paras 36-37. 
107 Above n 38, Tre Traklorer A kliebolag, 320-321, para 43. 
108 See especially above n 38, Benthem , 9, para 36. 
109 See also above n 38, Konig, 194-195, para 92; above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 18, para 
48. 
110 Above n 17, van Dijk, 141. 
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3 Access to a court/tribunal 
In Golder v United Kingdom 111 the Court was required to resolve an issue of 
fundamental importance. Did Article 6(1) only guarantee a fair hearing in 
legal proceedings which were already pending, or did it secure in addition a 
right of access to the courts for every person wishing to commence an action 
in order to have his or her civil rights and obligations determined?112 In a 
landmark judgement the Court concluded that Article 6(1) did secure a right 
of access to the courts;113 and that the applicant's effective exercise of that 
right had been violated in this case.114 
In Golder there had been a serious disturbance at a prison where the 
applicant was incarcerated. When a prison officer indentified him as having 
been involved in the disturbance, the applicant indicated that he wished to 
bring a civil action for libel. The Home Secretary, however, refused the 
applicant permission to contact a solicitor and effectively prevented him from 
bringing the action.115 In the European Court of Human Rights the applicant 
complained that the Home Secretary's refusal to allow him to contact a 
solicitor amounted to a breach of his rights under Article 6(1) of the 
Convention. The applicant argued that Article 6(1) secured a right of access 
to the courts, and that the Home Secretary's refusal had precluded his 
exercise of that right. 
111 Above n 38, Golder. 
112 Above n 38, Golder, 530-531, para 25. 
113 Golder has been followed in a line of cases including, for example, above n 38, Silver; above n 38, Skiirby; 
above n 38, Oerlemans. 
114 Above n 38, Golder, 531, para 26. 
115 Above n 38, Golder, 526-529, paras 10-20, 531, para 26. 
32 
The Court acknowledged that Article 6(1) did not expressly provide for a right 
of access to the courts,116 but concluded that such a right was implicit in the 
terms of the Article. It emphasised that this interpretation was based on a 
careful analysis of the terms of Article 6(1).117 In reality the Court was 
motivated by a desire to uphold the rule of law, a principle to which it clearly 
attached great importance. Noting the reference to the rule of law in the 
Convention's preamble,118 the Court thought it "both natural and in 
conformity with the principle of good faith"119 to bear in mind the rule of law 
when interpreting Article 6(1). 120 The Court considered it inconceivable that 
one could speak of the rule of law in relation to civil matters "without there 
being a possibility of having access to the courts".121 This supported the view 
that Article 6(1) secured a right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, the Court pointed to the serious consequences to which, in its view, 
a narrow interpretation of Article 6(1) might lead. If Article 6 (1) were not 
interpreted as securing a right of access to the courts, a State could, without 
breaching Article 6(1 ), "do away with its courts, or take away their jurisdiction 
to determine certain classes of civil actions and entrust it to organs dependent 
116 Above n 38, Golder, 532, para 28. 
117 Above n 38, Golder, 536, para 36. 
118 Above n 38, Golder, 535, para 34. The Convention's preamble provides (in pertinent part): 
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of Europe . . . Being 
resolved, as the Governments of European countries which are likeminded and hav a common 
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the 
collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration. 
Above n 2, 222-225. 
119 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty should be interpreted 
"in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in light of its object and purpose". For the text of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, see 1155 UNTS 331. 
120 Above n 38, Golder, 535, para 34. 
121 Above n 38, Golder, 535, para 34. 
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on the Govemment".122 Consequences such as these would be "indissociable 
from a danger of arbitrary power".123 The Court added: 
It would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the Court, that Article 6(1) 
should describe in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to parties 
in a pending lawsuit and should not first protect that which alone 
makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access 
to a court. The fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial 
proceedings are of no value at all if there are no judicial 
proceedings.124 
Moreover, the Court emphasised that the right of access to a court must be 
effective and not merely theoretical. Although the Home Secretary had not 
formally denied the applicant his right to institute proceedings before a court, 
he had effectively prevented him from commencing an action, and this 
amounted to a breach of Article 6(1). "Hindrance in fact", the Court 
considered, "can contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment".125 
Furthermore, it made no difference that the applicant could have commenced 
an action upon his release from prison, given that at the relevant time his 
release "was still rather remote". In the Court's view, "hindering the effective 
exercise of a right may amount to a breach of that right, even if the hindrance 
is of a temporary character".126 
The same concern to ensure the effectiveness of the right of access to a court 
is reflected in de Geouffre de la Pradelle v France. 127 In that case an 
application for judicial review of a government decree designating the 
applicant's land as an area of outstanding beauty had been dismissed as out of 
122 Above n 38, Golder, 536, para 35. 
123 Above n 38, Golder, 536, para 35. 
124 Above n 38, Golder, 535-536, para 35. Although in this passage the Court referred to the right of access to 
a court as arising in the context of a "lawsuit", the Court's subsequent jurisprudence indicates 
that the right of access does not apply in those circumstances only; as will be seen, the right of 
access to a court applies wherever civil rights and obligations are being determined, whether in 
the context of a "lawsuit" or otherwise. 
125 Above n 38, Golder, 531, para 26. 
126 Above n 38, Golder, 531, para 26]. 
127 Above n 38, de Geouffre de la Pradelle. 
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time and therefore inadmissible by the Conseil d'Etat. Although it was clearly 
possible for the applicant to challenge the decree in the Conseil d'Etat, 128 in 
practice the applicant was precluded from doing so by what the Court 
referred to as the "extreme complexity" of the relevant French law. This 
complexity was likely to have made uncertain the exact nature of the decree 
and also the time-limit for bringing an application for judicial review, 129 which 
accounted for the applicant's failure to register the application in time.130 In 
the Court's view, Article 6(1) entitled the applicant to "a clear, practical and 
effective opportunity to challenge an administrative act that was a direct 
interference with his right of property".131 Due to its complexity, the system 
was insufficiently coherent and clear, with the result that the applicant had not 
had a "practical, effective right of access to the Conseil d'Etat".132 
Golder and de Geouffre de la Pradelle reflect the Court's adherence to the 
principle of effectiveness.133 This well-established principle is designed to 
secure the effective exercise and effective enjoyment of human rights.134 It is 
central to the jurisprudence of the Court, which has stated that "the 
[European] Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective . " 135 It 
128 Above n 38, de Geouffre de la Pradelle, 16, para 29. 
129 Above n 38, de Geouffre de la Pradelle, 17, para 33]. 
130 It is submitted that the Court strongly implied without expressly identifying a link between the complexity 
of the law the applicant's failure to meet the time-limit: see above n 38, de Geouffre de la Pradelle, 16, para 
31 taken together with 17-18, paras 32-35. 
131 Above n 38, de Gcouffre de la Pradelle, 17, para 34. 
132 Above n 38, de Gcouffre de la Pradelle, 19, para 35. 
133 See generally J G Merrills The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988) 89-112; and A Shaw & AS Butler 'The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights comes alive (I)" [1991] NZU 400, 402. 
134 Mbenge v Zaire, Comm No 16/1977, GAOR, 38th Sess, Supp No 40, UN Doc A/38/40 (1983), p 134, 140, 
para 22. 
135 Artico v Italy (1980) 60 ILR 181, 1%-197; 3 EHRR 1, 13, para 33 (European Court of Human Rights) 
(emphasis added). 
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follows that the right of access to a court must be exercisable "in a real and 
practical way". 136 
An additional and important aspect of the right to a court is that Article 6(1) 
requires the court to have jurisdiction to determine all aspects of the dispute, 
whether they be issues of fact, law or merits.137 This principle was established 
in Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgi.um.138 That case involved 
the exercise of disciplinary powers over doctors by a professional committee, 
with a full re-hearing on the merits before an appeal tribunal and subject to 
judicial review on issues of law by the Court of Cassation. The Court held that 
the availability of judicial review on issues of law was insufficient to satisfy 
Article 6(1), because Article 6(1) also required judicial review of issues of fact 
and of the merits of the disciplinary committee's decision, including the 
appropriateness of the penalties imposed upon the applicant doctors. These 
were issues which the Court of Cassation had no power to determine. The 
appeal tribunal did have such power, but it neither sat in public nor gave 
judgement publicly as Article 6(1) required. It followed that the issues of fact 
and the merits of the decision, both of which were as crucial to the outcome of 
the dispute as the issues of law, had not been determined by a body which 
satisfied Article 6(1 )'s requirements.139 The inadequacy of judicial review of 
legality alone was confirmed in Spo,rong and Lonnroth v Sweden.140 In that 
case the merits of a governmental decision to authorise the expropriation of 
136 Above n 38, Airey, 316, para 26 (European Court of Human Rights) (emphasis added). In respect of the 
effective exercise of the right of access to a court, see also above n 38, Spo"ong and Lonnroth; above n 38, 
Pudas; above n 38, Bodtfn; and above n 38, Mats Jacobsson. Compare above n 38, Gillow, 357, para 69. 
137 Compare Kaplan v United Kingdom 4 EHRR 64 (European Commission). 
138 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere. 
139 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 19, para 5l(b). See also above n 38, Feldbrugge (full 
Appeals Board had no power to go into merits); above n 38, Wv United Kingdom, above n 38, R v United 
Kingdom, above n 38, 0 v United Kingdom, above n 38, B v United Kingdom and above n 38, H v United 
Kingdom (judicial review only as to legality of authority's decision); above n 38, Obenneier (administrative 
court had power to determine questions of law only). 
140 Above n 38, Spo"ong and Lonnroth. 
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the applicants' property were technically reviewable by the Supreme 
Administrative Court, but such a review was restricted in its scope and rarely 
undertaken. In the Court's view, because judicial review of the merits was 
undertaken only in exceptional circumstances, the applicant did not have an 
effective and practical right of access to a court for a "full review of measures 
affecting a civil right".141 This failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 
6(1).142 
At this point some clarification is required. The cases of Le Compte, Van 
Leuven and De Meyere and Sporrong and Lonnroth may give the impression 
that, under Article 6(1), the court in question must have power to determine 
issues of fact and merits as well as issues of law. But that is not strictly the 
correct position. What Article 6(1) requires is that the court have power to 
determine all aspects of the dispute. That is not the same thing, because issues 
of fact or merits will not necessarily be aspects of the dispute. This is 
illustrated by the case of James v United Kingdom.143 In that case the 
applicants had been deprived of their ownership of a number of properties 
through · the exercise by their tenants of rights of acquisition under the 
Leasehold Reform Act 1967.144 The 1967 Act conferred on the tenants the 
right to purchase compulsorily the freehold of the properties on prescribed 
terms and subject to certain prescribed conditions.145 There was no provision 
under the 1967 Act for the applicants to challenge the tenants' right of 
acquisition on the grounds of individual merits or hardship; the applicants 
could only allege that the terms and conditions laid down in the Act had not 
been satisfied. It followed that the merits of the acquisition could not be an 
141 Above n 38, Spo"ong and Lonnroth , 58, para 86. 
142 Above n 38, Spo"ong and Lonnroth, 58, para 87. Very similar facts arose in above n 38, Pudas, above n 38, 
Boden; and above n 38, Mats lacobsson. 
143 Above n 38,James. 
144 Above n 38,James, 126, para 10. 
145 Above n 38,James, 126, para 11. 
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aspect of any dispute; accordingly, Article 6(1) did not require that the courts 
have power to determine the merits. By contrast, whether there had been 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the 1967 Act was potentially 
disputable, and Article 6(1) required such disputes to be determined by a 
court. The Court held that, in so far as any dispute might arise concerning 
compliance with terms and conditions of the 1967 Act, the applicants had 
"unimpeded access to a tribunal competent to determine any such issue";146 
and this met the requirements of Article 6(1). It was not necessary that the 
court have power to determine the merits as well as issues of fact and law, 
because the merits could not be an aspect of the dispute. This illustrates that 
there is nothing magical about issues of fact or merits for the purposes of 
Article 6(1); they become important only if they are aspects of the dispute in 
question. 
Of course, in many cases issues of fact or merits will be aspects of the dispute. 
In Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere and in Sporrong and Lonnroth, for 
example, the merits of the respective decisions to impose disciplinary 
penalities and to authorise the expropriation of property were crucial to the 
outcome of the disputes in question. In such circumstances, judicial review 
merely as to the legality of the decisions would not meet the requirements of 
Article 6(1), because the court would not review all aspects of the dispute. By 
contrast, in a case such as James, judicial review on issues of fact and law will 
suffice, as these are the only issues arising. It follows that, where a case 
concerns the exercise of a decision-making power, Article 6(1) requires that 
the court have power to substitute its own decision for that of the original 
decision-maker. 
146 Above n 38, James, 158, para 81. In particular, disputes over a tenant's entitlement to acquire the freehold 
under the 1967 Act and over related matters were within the jurisdiction of the County Court; and the 
purchase price payable was subject to determination, in default of agreement, by the local Leasehold 
Valuation Tribunal (or, formerly, the Lands Tribunal): above n 38,James, 159, 134-135, 24-25. 
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The implications of the Golder judgement are clearly far-reaching. Article 
6(1) secures a right of access to a court whenever a person's civil rights or 
obligations are being determined; that right of access must be practical and 
effective; and the court must have power to determine all aspects of the 
dispute, which may include issues of fact and merits as well as issues of law. 
However, it is important to note that the Court in Golder recognised that "the 
right of access to the courts is not absolute".147 In the Court's view, there must 
be room for limitations by implication, given that the right of access to a court 
is itself implicit in Article 6(1),148 and also because the right "by its very nature 
calls for regulation by the State".149 However, the Court emphasised that 
limitations must never injure the substance of the right of access to the courts 
nor conflict with other rights enshrined in the Convention.150 In Golder, the 
limitation placed on the applicant's right of access to the courts could not be 
justified, because "[i]t was not for the Home Secretary himself to appraise the 
prospects of the action contemplated; it was for an independent and impartial 
court to rule on any claim that might be brought".151 
In a series of cases since Golder the Court has identified some of the 
limitations upon the right to a court. One limitation is that the right to a court 
need not be observed at each stage in the determination of civil rights and 
obligations. This means that Article 6(1) does not preclude administrative or 
other bodies which are neither courts nor tribunals within the meaning of 
Article 6(1) from taking measures which affect civil rights and obligations, 
147 Above n 38, Golder, 537, para 38. 
148 See also above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 202, para 90. 
149 Above n 38, Golder, 537, para 38. 
150 Above n 38, Golder, 537, para 38. The Court followed its judgement in the Belgian Linguistic Case (No 2) 1 
EHRR 252, 281, para 5, in respect of the right to education. See also above n 38, Winterwe,p , 414 para 75 
(mental illness may render legitimate certain limitations upon the exercise of the right to a court, but 
cannot warrant the total absence of that right). 
151 Above n 38, Golder, 538, para 40. 
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provided that these measures are subject to review by a body which does meet 
Article 6(1)'s requirements. This was established in Le Compte, Van Leuven 
and De Meyere v Belgi,um.152 That case concerned the exercise by the medical 
profession of disciplinary powers over doctors. The disciplinary matter had 
been dealt with by three bodies: first, the Provincial Council of the Medical 
Association; secondly, the Association's Appeals Council; and, thirdly, the 
Court of Cassation. The European Court of Human Rights held that Article 
6(1) did not require all three bodies to be a court or tribunal within the 
meaning of the Article. Justifying its conclusion by reference to essentially 
pragmatic considerations, the Court stated: 
Demands of flexibility and efficiency, which are fully compatible with 
the protection of human rights, may justify the prior intervention of 
administrative or professional bodies and, a fortiori, of judicial bodies 
which do not satisfy the said requirements in every respect; the legal 
tradition of many member States of the Council of Europe may be 
invoked in support of such a system.153 
This meant that it was not necessary for the Provincial Council to comply with 
the requirements of Article 6(1); in particular, the Council did not need to be 
a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6(1).154 What Article 6(1) did 
require, however, was that the Appeals Council and the Court of Cassation be 
"tribunals" within the meaning of the Article, the Appeals Council because it 
determined issues of fact and merits and the Court of Cassation because it 
determined issues of law.155 
The position is neatly summarised in Albert and Le Compte v Belgi,um: 
Even in instances where Article 6(1) is applicable, conferring powers 
[ on jurisdictional organs of professional associations] does not zn itself 
infringe the Convention. Nonetheless, in such circumstances the 
Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems: either 
the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of 
152 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere. 
153 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 19, para 5l(a). Compare above n 38, Schuler-
Zgraggen, 21 , para 2 (partly dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh). 
154 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Lcuven and De Meyere, 19, para 5l(a). 
155 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 20, para 54. 
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Article 6(1), or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent 
control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the 
guarantees of Article 6(1)_156 
Some may criticise Article 6(1) on the basis that it 'Judicialises" administrative 
processes to an inappropriate degree. The Court, however, has resisted any 
invitations to peg back the requirement that there be access to a court which 
has the power of determination. In Wv United Kingdom,157 a case concerning 
decisions by a local authority to restrict and terminate the applicant's access to 
his child, the United Kingdom Government argued that it was preferable to 
leave the discretion as to access to the local authority rather than to the courts 
because of, first, the large number of children in public care and, secondly, the 
need to take decisions urgently and without delay, through specialised social 
workers and as part of a continuous process.158 The Court was "not 
unmindful" of the Government's arguments but considered that this was an 
area in which it was "essential to ensure that the rights of individual parents 
[were] protected"; and, moreover, that in any case "Article 6(1) does not 
require that all access decisions must be taken by the courts but only that they 
shall have power to determine any substantial disputes that may arise".159 It 
follows that mere administrative expediency cannot justify a departure from 
the requirements of Article 6(1). Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the 
availability of review by a court does not inevitably lead to government by 
paralysis; it does not follow that the right will constantly be exercised, 
especially in light of the fact that Article 6(1) does not permit trivial disputes 
to be taken on appeal, as the Court emphasised in this passage from W's case. 
156 Above n 38, Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, 542, para 29 ( emphasis added; footnotes omitted). 
157 Above n 38, Wv United Kingdom. 
158 Above n 38, Wv United Kingdom, 57, para 79. 
159 Above n 38, Wv United Kingdom, 57, para 79. See also above n 38, Eriksson, 205, paras 80-81, 207, paras 
90-92. 
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It is clear, therefore, that Article 6(1) allows for the intervention of 
administrative and other bodies which do not meet the requirements of the 
Article. It must not be lost sight of, however, that the decisions of such bodies 
must be subject to review by a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6(1). 
The final power of decision in respect of each aspect of the dispute must be 
reposed in a "tribunal" which meets the requirements of Article 6(1 ). It will 
not suffice if the tribunal's decisions are subject to review by a body which 
does not meet Article 6(1)'s requirements. This is illustrated by Le Compte, 
Van Leuven and De Meyere. In that case, the Appeals Council was a "tribunal" 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) and had power to determine issues of fact, 
merits and law, but that in itself did not satisfy Article 6(1) because the Court 
of Cassation had power to overturn the Council's rulings on issues of law. 
Accordingly, Article 6(1) required the Court of Cassation also to be a 
"tribunal" within the meaning of the Article.160 Otherwise, the final power of 
decision in respect of issues of law would not have resided in a body meeting 
the requirements of Article 6(1). 
There remains the question whether Article 6(1) has any impact at all upon 
the procedures of administrative bodies which intervene at an earlier stage in 
the decision-making process. Some may argue that Article 6(1) absolves such 
bodies from the duty to observe any procedural requirements, provided that 
their decisions are subject to review by bodies which do meet the 
requirements of the Article and have power to determine all aspects of the 
dispute. The result, so the argument runs, is that Article 6( 1) does not require 
administrative bodies to observe even a minimum standard of fair procedure. 
This would have serious drawbacks, because the interests of fair dealing and 
good administration are better served if administrative bodies observe basic 
160 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 20, para 54. 
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procedural standards, irrespective of whether their decisions are subject to 
review by a body which provides more extensive safeguards. 
However, it is overly simplistic to say that Article 6(1) has no impact at all 
upon the procedures of administrative bodies which intervene at an earlier 
stage in the decision-making process. In some circumstances, an 
administrative body may need to comply with Article 6(1), even if there is 
provision for review of its decisions by a tribunal. Consider, for example, the 
case where a disciplinary committee suspends an employee from her duties on 
a charge of theft. Suppose that as a result of the suspension the employee 
suffers damage to her reputation, and consequently her career prospects and 
livelihood are jeopardised. Suppose also that the committee's decision is 
subject to review by a tribunal which meets the requirements of Article 6(1) 
and has jurisdiction to determine the issues of fact, law and merits arising out 
of the suspension. On its face, this scheme appears to comply with Article 
6(1): the tribunal is able to reverse the committee's suspension order. But can 
it be said that the tribunal is able to reverse the whole impact of the 
suspension order? It is true that the tribunal does have the final word on the 
merits and legality of the suspension and, accordingly, is able to restore the 
complainant to her previous employment. Yet, even if the suspension is 
reversed, from the employee's perspective the damage has already been done. 
She has suffered an injury to her reputation, career prospects and livelihood 
which the tribunal cannot undo. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that 
the employee has had access to a tribunal meeting the requirements of Article 
6(1) in respect of the determination of all of her rights. Her rights to a 
reputation and to a livelihood have been determined by the disciplinary 
committee, an administrative body, which does not meet the requirements of 
Article 6(1). 
43 
Moreover, even if the tribunal is able indirectly to determine those rights, that 
will not satisfy Article 6(1). The Court has indicated elsewhere that only a 
direct determination may suffice. In W v United Kingdom, 161 the Court held 
that the applicant's ability to challenge the decision to take the child into 
public care before the English courts did not meet the requirements of Article 
6(1). In the Court's view, "whether a child should be in public care and 
whether his parent should have access to him are matters to which different 
considerations may well apply"; accordingly, it was necessary that the 
applicant be able to challenge the restriction and termination of his right of 
access directly.162 This illustrates that review by a tribunal will not suffice if 
the tribunal is unable to determine directly all the rights at issue. 
In Ashingdane v United Kingdom163 the Court indicated how it would 
determine the validity of limitations on the right of access to a court. It held 
that limitations must meet a proportionality test: 
... the limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the access left to 
the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of 
the right is impaired.11641 Furthermore, a limitation will not be 
compatible with Article 6(1) if it does not pursue a legi,timate aim and if 
there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.165 
In Ashingdane, the applicant was a patient who had been placed in a secure 
special hospital. Despite authorisation from the Home Secretary,166 the 
Secretary of State for Social Services refused to direct the applicant's transfer 
to a local psychiatric hospital, due to a ban by nursing staff on the admission 
161 Above n 38, Wv United Kingdom. See also above n 38, above n 38, R v United Kingdom 74, above n 38, 0 v 
United Kingdom, above n 38, B v United Kingdom and above n 38, H v United Kingdom. 
162 Above n 38, Wv United Kingdom , 57, para 81. 
163 Above n 38,Ashingdane. 
164 See above n 38, Golder, 537, para 38; above n 38, Winterwerp , 414, para 75. This proposition represented 
no real advance on what had already been established in Golder and other cases. 
165 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 546-547, para 57 
166 Pursuant to section 65(3)(c) of the Mental Health Act Act 1959. 
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of patients like the applicant. The Secretary's refusal was made pursuant to 
section 99 of the Mental Health Act 1959.167 
The applicant instituted proceedings for judicial review of the refusal, 168 but 
these were stayed due to the operation of section 141 of the 1959 Act. Section 
141 provided that no person could be liable to civil proceedings in respect of 
any act done under the 1959 Act "unless the act was done in bad faith or 
without reasonable care";169 and the Court of Appeal found that neither of 
these grounds had been made out.170 The applicant argued that section 141 of 
the 1959 Act did not apply, because the act at issue was not the refusal of 
transfer under section 99 of the 1959 Act but the failure of the Secretary of 
State for Social Services to comply with section 3 of the National Health 
Service Act 1977,171 which imposed a duty on him to provide hospital 
accomodation "to such an extent as he considers necessary to meet all 
reasonable requirements".172 However, the Court of Appeal considered that 
the act out of which liability was said to arise was the refusal of transfer under 
section 99 of the 1959 Act, not a failure to comply with section 3 of the 1977 
Act.173 Accordingly, section 141 of the 1959 Act applied, and the applicant's 
action could not proceed. 
In the European Court of Human Rights the applicant complained of the 
decision of the Court of Appeal whereby his action was barred due to the 
operation of section 141 of the 1959 Act. He argued that the Court of 
167 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 531, para 14. 
168 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 532, para 16. 
169 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 532-533, para 17. 
170 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 533-534, para 18(a). 
171 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 533, para 18(a). 
172 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 536, para 25 . 
173 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 533, para 18(a). 
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Appeal's decision amounted to a breach of his right to a court under Article 
6(1) of the Convention.174 
In the Court's view, the applicant's claim in the domestic courts was based on 
section 3 of the 1977 Act. Assuming without deciding that section 3 arguably 
conferred a right on the individual citizen, the Court accepted that section 141 
of the 1959 Act limited the applicant's access· to the courts in order to have 
that right determined.175 The question was whether the limit on access was 
justifiable by reference to the proportionality test. 
The Court noted that section 141 was designed to avoid the risk of those 
responsible for the care of mental patients being unfairly harrassed by 
litigation. In the Court's view, that objective was clearly legitimate in relation 
to hospital staff as individuals. In relation to the Local Health Authority and 
the Department of Health and Social Security, however, its legitimacy was less 
obvious and "closer scrutiny" was required.176 
Section 141 of the 1959 Act had the effect of limiting claims based on section 
3 of the 1977 Act in so far as they related to acts done under the 1959 Act. 
The applicant's claim based on section 3 of the 1977 Act could proceed only if 
bad faith or negligence were alleged. This effectively limited the applicant's 
right of access to the courts. However, the Court considered that this 
limitation was justifiable in terms of the proportionality test. It noted that 
section 141 of the 1959 Act "only partially precluded the responsible 
authorities from being sued"; the applicant retained the capacity to sue, 
provided that he alleged bad faith or negligence and obtained the leave of the 
174 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 545, para 53. 
175 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 547, para 58. 
176 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 547, para 58. 
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High Court. In the Court's view, this limitation "did not impair the very 
essence" of the applicant's right of access to a court, nor "transgress the 
principle of proportionality".177 Accordingly, this limitation did not breach 
Article 6(1) of the Convention. 
The Court referred to an additional limitation on the applicant's right of 
access to a court. It noted that the legal obligation imposed on the Minister 
by section 3 of the 1977 Act was "couched in rather general terms" and, 
accordingly, conferred a wide discretion. In the Court's view, ''by its very 
nature and quite apart from section 141 of the 1959 Act" the obligation under 
section 3 was "not . . . amenable to full judicial control by the national 
courts".178 This suggests that, even if section 141 of the 1959 Act had not 
limited the applicant's right of access to the court's, the wording of section 3 
itself might have done so, due to the reluctance of the courts to intervene 
where a discretion is widely-framed. As it expressed no conclusions on this 
point, it is unclear whether the Court would have considered it necessary for a 
limitation of this nature to satisfy the proportionality test. Logic, however, 
suggests that it would be necessary. That raises the possibility that 
discretionary powers may offend against Article 6(1) of the Convention on the 
basis that they are too vaguely or too widely worded. Alternatively, it may be 
that the width of the discretion justifies a more limited type of review, which 
excludes consideration of issues of fact or merits. This is consistent with the 
Court's reference to "full" review by the courts of the obligation imposed by 
section 3 of the 1977 Act. 
177 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 547-548, para 59. 
178 Above n 38,Ashingdane, 547, para 59. 
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In Lithgow v United Kingdom 179 the Court applied the proportionality test and 
found that the limitations in question could be justified by reference to it. In 
Lithgow, the United Kingdom Parliament had enacted the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977 which nationalised the aircraft and 
shipbuilding industries. The applicants were among the many shareholders 
whose shares in companies were compulsorily acquired. The Act made 
provision for compensation to be payable to the shareholders. An arbitration 
tribunal was established which was empowered to resolve disputes concerning 
the compensation payable in each case by determining the "base value" of the 
shares. Shareholders did not have an individual right of access to the tribunal; 
the Act provided instead for a collective system of dispute-resolution, whereby 
the parties which appeared before the tribunal were the Secretary of State for 
Industry and a representative of the shareholders of each company. The 
applicants complained that the absence of an individual right of access to the 
arbitration tribunal as regards the determination of their right to 
compensation constituted a breach of Article 6( 1) of the Convention.180 
However, the Court held that there was no breach of Article 6(1) in this 
respect. It considered that, "[n]otwithstanding this bar on individual access, 
the Court does not consider that in the particular circumstances the very 
essence of Sir William Lithgow's right to a court was impaired".181 In the 
Court's view, the interests of each shareholder were protected, albeit 
indirectly, in three ways. First, the shareholders' representative was 
appointed by and represented the interests of all the shareholders of the 
company concerned. Secondly, the 1977 Act provided for shareholder 
meetings at which the representative could be instructed. Thirdly, in addition 
179 Above n 38,Lithgow, (1986) 8 EHRR 329 
180 Above n 38, Lithgow, 394, para 195. 
181 Above n 38, Lithgow, 394, para 1%. 
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to the shareholders' power to remove their representative, remedies were 
available against a representative who failed to comply with either his duties 
under the Act or his Common Law obligations as agent.182 Accordingly, the 
limitation did not remove the applicant's right of access to a court altogether. 
Moreover, in the Court's view, the limitation on the direct right of access to a 
court pursued a legitimate aim, namely, "to avoid, in the context of a large-
scale nationalisation measure, a multiplicity of claims and proceedings 
brought by individual shareholders".183 Furthermore, the Court considered 
that there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim of avoiding a multiplicity of claims. In this respect, the 
Court noted the powers and duties of the shareholders' representative, and 
the Government's margin of appreciation under the Convention.184 
Lithgow's case indicates that the right of access to a court may be triggered 
even although a determination affects the civil rights and obligations of many 
people in the same way. In such circumstances access to the court may 
justifiably be limited, as Lithgow demonstrates, but it must not be reduced to 
such an extent as to impair very essence of the right. This is illustrated by the 
case of Phi/is v Greece, 185 where the applicant engineer had been precluded 
from seeking direct redress through the courts for the non-payment of fees for 
design projects. Under Greek law, the Technical Chamber of Greece was 
subrogated to the rights of the payee engineer. The Chamber had a duty to 
institute proceedings and to pay the sum received into a special bank account 
for the engineer. There was no provision for the engineer to bring a parallel 
182 Above n 38, Lithgow, 394, para 1%. 
183 Above n 38,Lithgow, 394, para 197. 
184 Above n 38, Lithgow, 394-395, para 197. 
185 Above n 38, Phi/is. 
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action or to intervene before the Chamber had instituted proceedings.186 The 
Court acknowedged that there were advantages in this system: the Chamber 
provided the services of experienced counsel and paid legal costs which a 
number of engineers may have been unable to meet.187 However, the 
scheme's advantages did not justify the consequent limitation upon the 
applicant's right of access to the courts. In the Court's view, because the 
applicant could not institute proceedings, directly and independently, to seek 
the payment from his clients of fees which were owed to him, the "very 
essence" of his right to a court had been impaired.188 Therein lies the material 
distinction between Lithgow and Philis: in Lithgow the applicants had indirect 
access to the arbitration tribunal through representatives which ultimately 
were under their control; whereas, in Philis, the applicant did not enjoy even 
indirect access to the courts, because he was unable to exert any control over 
the Technical Chamber. 
The implications of Golder have clearly been far-reaching. Article 6(1) 
secures a right of access to a court whenever a person's civil rights or 
obligations are being determined; that right of access must be practical and 
effective; and the court must have power to determine all aspects of the 
dispute, which may include issues of fact and merits as well as issues of law. 
Although limitations on the right to a court are permissible, they must be 
justified by reference to a proportionality test, and may not remove the right 
of access to a court altogether. 
186 Above n 38, Phi/is, 766-767, paras 61-62, 767-768, paras 63-64. 
187 Above n 38, Phi/is, 766, para 61. 
188 Above n 38, Phi/is, 768, para 65. 
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4 "tribunal" 
Where a dispute arises in respect of which Article 6(1) applies, there must be 
provision for a determination of the dispute by a "tribunal". What constitutes 
a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6(1)? As Golder's case 
demonstrates,189 there can be no doubt that "courts of law of the classic kind" 
are tribunals within the meaning of the Article. However, this does not mean 
that "tribunal" is to be equated with "court". The European Court of Human 
Rights has emphasised that the term "tribunal" in Article 6(1) "is not 
necessarily to be understood as signifying a court of law of the classic kind, 
integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country".190 It follows 
that the term "tribunal" must be taken to refer to a wider range of bodies than 
courts alone. 
In determining whether a body other than a court is a tribunal, it is necessary 
to focus upon the substantive function and character of the body.191 The 
formal classification of the body is not decisive; indeed, a number of bodies 
have been held to be tribunals within the meaning of Article 6(1) despite their 
not being classified as such in the domestic law of the State Party 
concerned.192 
189 See also above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 20, para 55 (Court of Cassation "obviously" a 
tribunal). 
190 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 198, para 76. See also above n 38, Lithgow, where an arbitration tribunal 
was held to be a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6(1) despite being set up for the purpose of 
adjudicating a limited number of special issues affecting a limited number of companies. See also Above n 
38, Fe/dbrugge, 429, para 18 where the President of the Appeals Board, "a judge appointed for life who gave 
a reasoned decision referring to the conclusions of a medical expert", was held to be a "tribunal" within the 
meaning of Article 6(1 ). 
191 Above n 38, Sramek, 362, para 36. 
192 See, for example, above n 38, Sramek, 362, para 36 (regional real property transactions authority); 
Campbell and Fell, 198, para 76 (prison board of visitors) and H v Belgium, 350, para 50 (Council of the 
Ordre des avocats) . 
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The term "tribunal" in Article 6(1) denotes "bodies which exhibit ... common 
fundamental features".1 93 The Court has identified the most important of 
these features. It is necessary that the body exercise judicial functions, 
although that in itself will not suffice.194 Additional elements must be present. 
The body must be independent of the executive and of the parties to the 
dispute; it must afford the guarantees of a judicial procedure; and, moreover, 
the length of its members' term of office must be of an adequate duration.195 
If any of these features are not present, the body will not be a tribunal within 
the meaning of Article 6(1). 
An additional and crucial requirement, in the Court's view, is that the body 
must exercise a power of decision. It will not be enough for the body's 
function to be recommendatory only. This proposition emerges from 
Benthem v the Netherlands. 196 That case involved the revocation by the Crown 
of the applicant's statutory license to operate a liquid petroleum gas 
installation at his service station. The license had initially been granted by the 
municipal authorities but was revoked on appeal by the Crown after a hearing 
before the Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of State. The 
Crown determined the appeal on the advice of the Division;197 although able 
to depart from that advice, in practice the Crown very rarely did so.198 
193 Above n 38, Benthem v Netherlands , 11, para 43. 
194 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 20, para 55; above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 181, para 
39(c). A body performs a judicial function when "determining matters within its competence on the basis 
of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner": above n 38, H v Belgium, 350, 
para 50. 
195 Above n 38, Benthem, 11, para 43; above n 38, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp , 407, 408, paras 76, 78; above n 
38, Campbell and Fell, 198, para 76; above n 38, Xv United Kingdom, 207, para 53. See above n 38, 
Neumeister v Austria (No 1) 1 EHRR 91, 132, para 24; above n 38, Ringeisen (No 1) , 490, para 95; above n 
38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 20, para 55; above n 38, Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, 543, 
para 31; above n 38,Lithgow, 396, para 201; above n 38, Hv Belgium; above n 38, Sramek362, para 36. 
196 Above n 38,Benthem. 
197 Above n 38, Benthem, 5, para 21. 
198 Above n 38,Benthem, 6, para 26. 
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In the Court's view, although the Administrative Litigation Division acted like 
a court, and although only very rarely did the competent Minister depart from 
its proposals to the letter, the Division was not a "tribunal" within the meaning 
of Article 6(1). The Court acknowledged that, in determining whether the 
Convention has been complied with, "one must frequently look beyond the 
appearances and the language used and concentrate on the realities of the 
situation".199 However, it could not be overlooked that "a power of decision is 
inherent in the very notion of [tribunal] within the meaning of the 
Convention".200 Accordingly, the Division was not a "tribunal" because it only 
tendered advice. Although the Division's advice was only rarely departed 
from, that was "only a practice of no binding force".201 
It follows that, for the purposes of Article 6(1), a distinction must be drawn 
between bodies which have a power of determination and those which have a 
power of recommendation. Only the former can be tribunals within the 
meaning of the Article. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Court attached 
greater weight to the theoretical possibility that the Crown might depart from 
the Division's recommendations than to the practical likelihood that those 
recommendations would be followed. This indicates that compliance in 
practice with Article 6(1) does not eliminate the need for a formal guarantee 
that its requirements will be met. 
It is clear that a body cannot be regarded as a "tribunal" when it acts in an 
administrative capacity. This is because a "tribunal" is characterised by its 
judicial function;202 by hypothesis, a "tribunal" does not perform an 
199 Above n 38, Bcnth1:111, 10, para 40. 
200 Above n 38,Benthem, 10, para 40. 
201 Above n 38,Benthf:111, 10, para 40. 
202 A "tribunal" is "characterised in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial function": above n 38, H v 
Belgi,um, 350, para 50. 
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administrative function. This distinction was drawn by the Court in 
Benthem.203 As has been seen,204 in that case the power of decision in respect 
of the license lay with the Crown. The expression "the Crown", when decision-
making powers were being exercised, was "commonly used to denote the King 
together with the Minister or Ministers".205 Although the Crown was 
empowered to determine the dispute, a power of decision did not in itself 
render the Crown a "tribunal"; Article 6(1) required that additional elements 
be present, including independence, impartiality and the guarantees of 
judicial procedure.206 The Court held that the Crown could not be a "tribunal" 
in these circumstances since, in deciding whether to revoke the license, it was 
acting in an administrative and not a judicial capacity.207 Its administrative 
function was revealed in that "the Royal Decree by which the Crown ... 
rendered its decision constituted, from the formal point of view, an 
administrative act"; the Crown was acting in its capacity as head of the 
executive, and the Royal Decree emanated from a Minister, who was 
responsible to Parliament for it.208 Moreover, the Minister was the 
hierarchical superior of the Regional Health Inspector, who had lodged the 
appeal against the grant of the license, and of the Ministry's Director-General, 
who had submitted a technical report to the Division; this also suggested that 
the Crown in this context was not acting independently of the executive.209 
Accordingly, the term "tribunal" in Article 6(1) does not refer to bodies which 
are acting in an administrative capacity or as an arm of the executive. 
203 Above n 38, Benthem. 
204 Above, text accompanying n 197. 
205 Above n 38, Benthem, 5, para 23. 
206 Above n 38,Benthem, 11, para 43. 
207 Above n 38, Benthem, 10-11, para 41. 
208 Above n 38, Benthem, 11, para 43. 
209 Above n 38, Benthem, 11, para 43. 
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It is important to note, however, that a body is not precluded from being a 
"tribunal" by the mere fact that on occasions it acts in an administrative 
capacity. The same body can alternate between administrative and judicial 
functions; and, accordingly, can be a "tribunal" at one point in time and not at 
the next. In the view of the European Court, a "plurality of powers cannot in 
itself preclude an institution from being a [tribunal] in respect of some of 
them".210 This proposition was applied in Campbell and Fell v United 
Kingdom,211 where the Court held that a prison board of visitors was, "when 
carrying out its adjudicatory tasks", a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 
6(1) notwithstanding that it also performed other functions as part of the day-
to-day administration of the prison.212 The mere fact that the board of visitors 
acted in an administrative capacity on some occasions did not prevent it from 
being a "tribunal" when acting as the adjudicator of prison disputes. 
This principle may be applied to a variety of bodies which perform diverse 
functions. It is particularly well-suited to describe the position of a 
government minister when performing his or her various functions. Consider, 
for example, the Minister of Social Welfare. On the one hand, the Minister 
will have ultimate responsibility for the operation of the Department of Social 
Welfare, including the policy pursued by the Department and the criteria 
which it applies in determining eligibility for benefits. In this context the 
Minister is acting in an administrative capacity. On the other hand, the 
Minister may be required by law to hear appeals from the decisions of 
Departmental officers in respect of, for example, a person's eligibility to 
receive a benefit. The mere fact that the Minister acts administratively when 
supervising the operation of the Department does not prevent her from being 
210 Above n 38, H v Belgium, 350, para 50. 
211 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell. 
212 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 198, para 76. 
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a "tribunal" when she is determining an appeal. What is required is that the 
Minister act judicially when determining the appeal. If the Minister does so, 
she may be regarded as a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6(1) when 
determining the appeal. The Minister must still exhibit the fundamental 
features of a "tribunal", of which the most important in this context is 
independence of the executive,213 but there is nothing in principle to preclude 
the Minister from being a "tribunal". 
5 "independent" 
As has been seen, independence of the executive and of the parties to the 
dispute is a fundamental feature of a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 
6(1).214 This feature is expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Article 
6(1), which requires that the tribunal be "independent and impartial". 
Accordingly, there is a degree of overlap between the terms "tribunal" and 
"independent". However, given that independence is an express requirement 
of the Article, the Court has considered it worthy of separate attention. 
There are some tribunals whose independence speaks for itself. These tend 
to be composed of members of the judiciary, who are presumed to act 
independently.215 Where it does not speak for itself, a tribunal's 
independence will be assessed by reference to a number of factors. These are 
the manner of appointment of the tribunal's members; the duration of its 
213 See above, text accompnaying n 193. 
214 See above, text accompanying n 193. 
215 See, for example, above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Mcyere, 20-21, para 57 and above n 38,Albert 
and Le Compte, 543, para 31 (members of the judiciary); above n 38, Sramek, para 40 (Judge of Innsbruck 
Court of Appeal and agricultural expert); above n 38, Feldbrugge, 436, para 42 (President of Appeals 
Board); above n 38, Ettl, 267, para 37 (judges of Regional Court and Court of Appeal); above n 38, 
Langborger, 425, para 31 (professional judges). 
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member's term of office; the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressures; and whether the body presents an appearance of independence.216 
The fact that a member of a tribunal is appointed by the executive or by a 
party to the dispute will not in itself raise a doubt as to that member's 
independence, provided that adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that 
the member will act independently and not as a representative of the 
executive or of that party. In Campbell and Fell, for example, although the 
members of the prison's Board of Visitors were appointed by the Home 
Secretary, who was himself responsible for the administration of prisons, their 
independence from the executive could not be called into question on that 
basis alone; in the Court's view, "to hold otherwise would mean that judges 
appointed by or on the advice of a Minister having responsibilities in the field 
of the administration of the courts were also not 'independent"'.217 Moreover, 
although the Home Office had the power to issue broad guidelines to Boards, 
"[the Boards were] not subject to its instructions in their adjudicatory role".218 
This provided an important guarantee that the members of the Board would 
not act as agents of the executive when performing their adjudicatory 
function. The executive could not dictate to the Board how it should 
determine any particular case. This guarantee was also present in Sramek's 
case, where the executive was prohibited by law from giving instructions to the 
government-appointed members of the Regional Real Property Transactions 
Authority.219 
216 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 198-199, para 78. 
217 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 199, para 79. 
218 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 199, para 79. 
219 Above n 38, Sramek, 359, para 26, 363, para 38, 364, para 41. See also above n 38, Lithgow, 3%, para 202; 
above n 38, H v Belgium, 350, para 51; and above n 38, Ettl, 267, para 38. 
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Furthermore, in order for a tribunal to be independent it is necessary that its 
members' term of office be of adequate duration and that the members be 
virtually irremovable during the term. These safeguards are designed to 
ensure that the executive does not influence a tribunal's decisions by 
threatening its members with dismissal. What constitutes an "adequate" 
duration of term will vary from case to case; terms of three,220 five221 and six222 
years have been held to be adequate. As regards irremovability, the Court has 
indicated that the mere existence of a power of removal does not compromise 
a tribunal's independence, provided that the power is only very rarely 
exercised in practice. In Campbell and Fell, for example, the members of the 
prison Board of Visitors held office for a term of three years or such less 
period as the Home Secretary might appoint.223 Although the Home 
Secretary could require a member to resign, in practice "this would be done 
only in the most exceptional circumstances".224 In the Court's view, this 
unlikely possibility did not threaten the independence of the Board: 
It is true that the irremovability of judges by the executive during their 
term of office must in general be considered as a corollary of their 
independence and thus included in the guarantees of Article 6(1). 
However, the absence of a formal recognition of this irremovability in 
the law does not in itself imply lack of independence provided that it is 
recognised in fact and that the other necessary guarantees are 
present.225 
This passage is difficult to reconcile with the decision in Benthem, where the 
Court insisted upon compliance with Article 6(1) both in practice and in 
form.226 
220 See above n 38, Sramek, 363, para 38. In above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 199, para 80, where the members 
of the prison Board of Visitors held office for a term of three years or such less period as the Home 
Secretary might appoint, the Court considered that the term of office was "admittedly relatively short", but 
for the "very understandable reason" that the members were unpaid for their service. 
221 See above n 38, Ettl, 268, para 41. 
222 See above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 20-21, para 57; above n 38, Albert and Le Compte, 
543, para 31. 
223 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 199, para 80. 
224 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 199, para 80. 
225 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 199, para 80 (footnotes omitted). 
226 See above nn 199-201 and accompanying text. 
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An additional and significant requirement is that the tribunal present the 
appearance of independence. A tribunal's composition will be particularly 
important in this regard, because a balanced membership will help to give the 
impression of independence.227 Although there is no objection in principle to 
the presence of civil servants on a tribunal,228 their presence may raise a doubt 
as to the tribunal's independence in a particular case. In Sramek v Austria the 
Court held that a regional authority's independence was compromised by the 
inclusion of civil servants among its membership because the government was 
itself a party to the dispute and one of the civil servants, who occupied the key 
position of rapporteur to the authority, had the government's representative as 
his hierarchical superior.229 Even though the government's representative was 
prohibited by law from giving and in fact did not give instructions to the 
rapporteur,230 the Court could not overlook the impression created by the 
rapporteur's subordinate status vis-a-vis the government's representative: 
Where, as in the present case, a tribunal's members include a person 
who is in a subordinate position, in terms of his duties and the 
organisation of his service, vis-a-vis one of the parties, litigants may 
entertain a legitimate doubt about that person's independence. Such a 
situation seriously affects the confidence which the courts may inspire 
in a democratic society.231 
It follows that it may be insufficient in some circumstances even to show that a 
tribunal did in fact act independently. The appearance of independence is as 
important as independence in fact. At the same time it should be noted that 
227 Above n 38,Le Compte, Van Leuven andDeMeyere, 20-21, para 57; above n 38,Albert and Le Compte, 543, 
para 31; above n 38, Sramek , 363, para 39; E11l, 266-267, para 36. 
228 Above n 38, Ringeisen (No 1), 490, para 95; above n 38, Ettl, 267-268, paras 38-40. 
229 Above n 38, Sramek, 364, para 41. 
230 Above n 38, Sramek, 358-359, para 26, 364, para 41. 
231 Above n 38, Sramek, 364, para 42 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, the mere fact that one member as a 
lawyer may have received instructions from the government in the past did not raise a doubt as to his 
independence: above n 38, Sramek, 363, para 40. Nor was there any difficulty in that the chairman of the 
regional authority happened to be a mayor; although municipalities exercised their powers subject to the 
government's supervision, the authority's activities did not involve the exercise of any such powers, and the 
mayor could not be subject to supervision in matters falling outside the ambit of those powers: above n 38, 
Sramek, 363-364, para 40. 
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the circumstances in Sramek were special. The civil servant occupied the 
strategically-important position of rapporteur; had his position been less 
pivotal, there may have been less reason to doubt the independence of the 
authority as a whole.232 
In other circumstances, however, there may still be an appearance of 
independence despite relatively close links between the tribunal and a party to 
the dispute. In Campbell and Fell, the Board of Visitors of the prison 
maintained contacts with the executive and the prison administration when 
acting in its supervisory role. This gave the inmates the impression that the 
Boad was closely associated with the executive and the prison administration. 
The Court, however, did not consider that these sentiments on the part of 
inmates were enough for there to be a lack of independence: such sentiments 
were "probably unavoidable in a custodial setting"; and it was significant that 
the Board had contact with the inmates also.233 In the Court's view, in order 
to show lack of independence the inmates would have needed to be 
"reasonably entitled, on account of frequent contacts between a Board and 
the authorities, to think that the former was dependent on the latter"; and the 
mere fact of these contacts could not justify such an impression, especially 
given that they existed with the inmates themselves.234 
Parallels may be drawn between the Board of Visitors in Campbell and Fell 
and a government minister. Consider the position of a minister who hears an 
appeal from a decision of his departmental officials. Although the minister 
may be regarded by the individual who brings the appeal as lacking in 
independence because of what is viewed as the close relationship between the 
232 Compare above n 38, Ettl, 267, paras 38-39. 
233 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 200, para 81. 
234 Above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 200, para 81. 
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minister and his departmental officials, such sentiments on the part of the 
individual will not be enough in themselves to establish a lack of 
independence. Applying the test formulated in Campbell and Fell, it would be 
necessary to show that the impression was reasonable and based on frequent 
contacts between the minister and his officials. There is, accordingly, an 
objective element which must be satisfied. In circumstances such as these, it 
may be difficult to show that the impression is reasonable, especially given 
that the minister is the hierarchical superior of the departmental officials. In a 
Sramek-type situation, however, where the tribunal member is subordinate to 
one of the parties to the dispute, such an impression is more likely to be well-
founded. 
6 "impartial" 
Article 6(1) expressly requires the tribunal to be "impartial" as well as 
"independent". Although Article 6(1) appears to treat independence and 
impartiality as separate and distinct concepts, in some circumstances the two 
concepts may be difficult to dissociate. If a tribunal is not independent of the 
executive or of both parties to the dispute, it is likely that the tribunal's 
impartiality will also be called into question.235 None the less, the Court has 
given separate consideration to the meaning of the term "impartial" in Article 
6(1). 
A tribunal's impartiality is assessed both subjectively and objectively.236 
Subjective impartiality refers to the personal impartiality of the tribunal's 
members, who are presumed to be impartial until there is proof to the 
235 See above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 20, para 55; above n 38, Sramek, 363-364, paras 38-
42; Above n 38, Ettl, 266-267, paras 36-41; Above n 38, Langborger v Sweden , 425, para 32. 
236 See above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 200-201 , paras 84-85. 
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contrary.237 Subjective impartiality, accordingly, concerns the impartiality in 
fact of the tribunal's members. Objective impartiality, by contrast, refers to 
the appearance of impartiality and to the internal organisation of the 
tribunal.238 This is also known as "structural" impartiality.239 In some cases, a 
tribunal's objective impartiality speaks for itself; this will usually be a court of 
the classic kind, or a tribunal composed of members of the judiciary.240 In 
other cases, the balanced membership of the tribunal and the manner of 
appointment of its members may give the assurance of impartiality.241 
In principle, the participation of tribunal members at an earlier stage of 
proceedings does not raise a doubt as to the tribunal's impartiality. In 
Ringeisen v Austria (No 1),242 for example, there was no difficulty in that two 
members of the Regional Commission had participated in an earlier decision 
of the Commission on the same case. In the Court's view, 
... it cannot be stated as a general rule resulting from the obligation to 
be impartial that a superior court which sets aside an administrative or 
judicial decision is bound to send the case back to a different 
jurisdictional authority or to a differently composed branch of that 
authority. 243 
In Gillow's case, furthermore, the fact that the Royal Court of Guernsey sat in 
almost the same composition in two related cases, one civil, the other 
criminal, was not in itself a reason "capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts 
237 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 21, para 58; above n 38,Albert and Le Compte, 543, 
para 32; above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 200, para 84; above n 38, H v Belgiwn, 350, para 52; above n 38, 
Gil/ow, 358-359, para 73. 
238 See above n 38, Albert and Le Compte, 543, para 32; above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 200, para 85; above n 
38, Lithgow, 396, para 202; and above n 38, H v Belgiwn, 350, para 52. 
239 See above n 38, Hv Belgiwn, 350, para 52. 
240 Above n 38, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 21, para 58 (Court of Cassation); above n 38, 
Feldbrugge, 436, para 42 (President of Appeals Board). 
241 See above n 38, Albert and Le Compte, 543-544, para 32 (members appointed by party to dispute acted in 
personal capacity only) and bove n 38, Lithgow, 396, para 202 (members appointed in consultation with 
parties to dispute). 
242 Above n 38, Ringeisen (No 1). 
243 Above n 38, Ringeisen (No 1), 490-491, para 97. 
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as to the impartiality of the Royal Court".244 Although there was a factual 
connection between the two appeals, they concerned two different people and 
two different questions. Moreover, it was common in the Convention 
countries, the Court noted, that higher courts deal with similar or related 
cases in turn.245 
The position is likely to be different in a case where a judge is hearing an 
application for leave to appeal from his or her own judgement. In such a case, 
there may be stronger grounds for arguing that there is a lack of objective 
impartiality. The connection between the original hearing and the application 
for leave to appeal may be so close as to give rise to legitimate doubts as to 
the judge's impartiality. An appearance of impartiality might, in such 
circumstances, be difficult to sustain. 
The difficulties associated with presenting an appearance of impartiality are 
well-illustrated by Langborger v Sweden.246 In that case, the applicant required 
the approval of the Housing and Tenancy Court for the deletion of a 
"negotiation clause from his lease. The Housing and Tenancy Court was 
composed of two professional judges and two lay assessors. The lay assessors 
were nominated by the Swedish Federation of Property Owners and the 
National Tenants' Union respectively, and then appointed by the 
Government. Only the lay assessors' impartiality was at issue.247 
Although, in the Court's view, the lay assessors were in principle extremely 
well-qualified to participate in the adjudication of disputes between landlords 
244 Above n 38, Gil/ow, 358, para 73. 
245 Above n 38, Gi/low, 358, para 73. Compare above n 38, Campbell and Fell, 200, para 85. 
246 Above n 38, Langborger. 
247 This was another case in which it was difficult to dissociate impartiality from independence: above n 38, 
Langborger, 425, para 32. 
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and tenants, their objective impartiality was open to doubt in these particular 
circumstances. The lay assessors were nominated by and had close links with 
the landlords' and tenants' organisations, which had an interest in the 
continued existence of the negotiation clause, since they derived their very 
existence from rent negotiations. Since the applicant sought the deletion from 
his lease of the negotiation clause, 
. . . he could legitimately fear that the lay assessors had a common 
interest contrary to his own and therefore that the balance of interests, 
inherent in the Housing and Tenancy Court's composition in other 
cases, was liable to be upset when the court came to decide his own 
claim.248 
It is noteworthy that the presence of two professional judges on the Housing 
and Tenancy Court made no difference to the result. The Court's objective 
impartiality could not be sustained in circumstances where its decision had 
direct consequences for the interests of the landlords' and tenants' 
associations with which two of the Court's members had close links. However, 
it would not be every case where circumstances such as these arose. Indeed, 
the European Court was careful to point out that in principle the Housing and 
Tenancy Court was well-qualified to adjudicate upon disputes between 
landlords and tenants. This illustrates that each case demands a careful study 
of the relevant relationships in order to assess whether doubts as to a 
tribunal's impartiality are justified. 
III SECTION 27(1) OF THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS 
This Part of the paper focuses on the meaning of section 27(1) of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights, which guarantees that the principles of natural justice 
shall be observed by any tribunal or other public authority which has the 
power to make a determination in respect of a person's rights, obligations, or 
248 Above n 38, Langborger, 426, para 35. 
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interests protected or recognised by law. The Part argues that section 27(1) 
must be interpreted consistently with Article 14(1) of the Covenant; and it 
explores some of the implications of this interpretation for administrative 
decision-making processes in New Zealand. 
A Proper Approach to Interpretation 
Section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights is the provision which is designed to 
implement Article 14(1) of the Covenant in New Zealand's domestic law.249 
Section 27(1) provides: 
Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has the 
power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, 
obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
The meaning of section 27(1) has not yet been tested in the Courts. However, 
the Court of Appeal has indicated the appropriate approach to the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights in general. In interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, it is important to consider its "nature and subject matter and special 
character".250 Of relevance is the Long Title which identifies the purposes of 
the Bill of Rights: 
(a) 
(b) 
To affirm, protect and promote human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in New Zealand; and 
To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The Long Title has two implications for the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights. First, paragraph (a) expresses "a positive commitment to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms" and reflects the "spirit [in which] 
249 A Bill of Rights For New Zealand: A White Paper, New Zealand. Parliament. House of Representatives. 
1985. AJHR. A 6. p 109. Article 14(1) extends the same guarantee of a fair hearing to persons facing a 
criminal charge. Section 25(a) of the Bill of Rights implements that aspect of Article 14(1). 
250 Noon v Ministry ofTranspon; Curran v Police [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 97, 151. 
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interpretation questions are to be resolved".251 It requires that the Bill of 
Rights "be construed generously" in a manner which is "suitable to give to 
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred 
to".252 A rights-centred approach is necessary.253 
Secondly, paragraph (b) of the Long Title recognises that the Bill of Rights 
was enacted to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the Covenant. This 
confirms that "[i]n approaching the Bill of Rights it must be of cardinal 
importance to bear in mind the antecedents".254 The provisions of the 
Covenant are of central importance to the proper interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights. Furthermore, it is implicit in paragraph (b) that the Bill of Rights 
reflects a commitment to international human rights standards.255 This means 
that the practice of other nations in the sphere of human rights is highly 
relevant. It is also significant that the Court of Appeal has said: "[w]hether a 
decision of the Human Rights Committee is absolutely binding in interpreting 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act may be debatable, but at least it must be 
of considerable persuasive authority".256 It follows that the practice of the 
Committee under Article 14(1) of the Covenant is of central importance to 
the proper interpretation of section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights. 
Some may argue that section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights represents little if any 
advance on the right to natural justice at Common Law.257 Because section 
27(1) appears to have been formulated by reference to the Common Law, so 
251 Above n 250. 
252 Flicldnger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1990-92) l NZBORR 1, 4; above n 250, 139-140. 
253 R v Goodwin (1992) 9 CRNZ 1, 45-46 per Richardson J. 
254 Above n 250, 142. 
255 This is reflected in the increasing extent to which the Court of Appeal is drawing upon international 
materials for guidance in interpreting the Bill of Rights: see for example R v Goodwin (No 2) [1993) 2 
NZLR 390, 393-394. 
256 Above n 255, 393. 
257 See J C Hay Section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 The Right to Justice: Something Old, 
Something New (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1991) 8-23. 
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the argument runs, the Common Law is determinative of section 27(1)'s 
meaning. The White Paper commentary on the draft Bill of Rights supports 
this argument: 
[Section 27(1 )] largely reflects basic principles of the common law .... 
In a general sense the provision will not change the courts' normal and 
long-standing task, except to the extent that the principles will now 
have an enhanced status.258 
However, this argument is misguided. It is clearly erroneous to interpret the 
Bill of Rights by reference to the Common Law. The Court of Appeal has 
stated emphatically that the Bill of Rights must be interpreted by reference to 
the provisions of the Covenant and internationally-proclaimed human rights 
standards.259 This approach to interpretation is supported by paragraph (b) 
of the Long Title, which states that the Bill of Rights is an Act to "affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to the [Covenant]". To interpret section 27(1) by 
reference to the Common Law would clearly undermine paragraph (b) of the 
Long Title. Given that section 27(1) is designed to implement Article 14(1) of 
the Covenant in New Zealand's domestic law,260 section 27(1) must be 
interpreted by reference to Article 14(1), not by reference to the Common 
Law. 
It follows that section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights falls to be interpreted by 
reference to the conclusions reached in Part II of this paper. The practice of 
the Human Rights Committee under Article 14(1) of the Covenant, taken 
together with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
under Article 6(1) of the European Convention, will be of central importance 
258 Above n 249, p 110. 
259 SeeR v Butcher and Burgess [1990-92) 1 NZBORR 59, 70 per Cooke P. 
260 See above n 249. 
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to the proper interpretation of section 27(1 ).261 As will be seen, the practice 
of the Committee and the jurisprudence of the European Court have far-
reaching implications for the meaning of section 27(1). Far from merely 
codifying the Common Law right to natural justice, section 27(1) of the Bill of 
Rights, by affirming New Zealand's commitment to Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant, affords much more extensive procedural protections to those 
affected by administrative processes than does the Common Law. 
B Impact of Article 14(1) of the Covenant on the Meaning of Section 27(1) 
As will be seen, the right to natural justice under section 27(1) differs from the 
right to natural justice at Common Law in two important respects. First, the 
right applies in a wider range of situations than it does at Common Law; and, 
secondly, the content of the right is more extensive than it is at Common law. 
Both of these differences are due to the impact of Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant upon the meaning of section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights. 
261 Moreover, the New Zealand courts can also be expected to refer to the jurisprudence of the Canadian 
Supreme Court under s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when interpreting s 27(1) of 
the Bill of Rights. Section 7 provides: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
Significantly, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that s 7 has substantive as well as procedural 
dimensions: Reference re Section 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) [1985) 2 SCR 486; 
Morgentaler, Srrwling and Scot/ v The Queen ( 1986) 1 SCR 30. See also Singh v Minister of Employment and 
Immigration (1985] 1 SCR 177. Section 7 has recently been considered by the Supreme Court in the 
following cases: R v Desousa (1992] 2 SCR 944; R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society (1992) 2 SCR 606; 
Schater v Canada (1992] 2 SCR 679; R v Rube (1992) 3 SCR 159; Idziak v Canada (1992) 3 SCR 631; R v 
Morales (1992) 3 SCR 711; R v Pearson (1992) 3 SCR 665; R v Gtnereux (1992) 1 SCR 259; Chiarelli v 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992] 1 SCR 711 ; R v Van Haar/em [1992] I SCR 982. 
See generally E Colvin "Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1989) 68 Can 
Bar Rev 560; R E Hawkins "lnterpretivism and Sections 7 & 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms" (1990) 22 Ott L Rev 275; DJ Mullan 'The Impact of the Charter on Administrative Procedure: 
The Meaning of Fundamental Justice" in Public Interest v Private Rights: Striking the Balance in 
Administrative Law (Pitbaldo Lectures, Manitoba, 1990) 29. 
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1 When does section 27 ( 1) apply? 
Section 27(1) requires that the "principles of natural justice" be observed by 
"any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to make a 
determination in respect of that person's rights, obligations, or interests 
protected or recognised by law". In what circumstances does section 27(1) 
require the principles of natural justice to be observed? The key words in the 
section, it is submitted, are "determination in respect of that person's rights, 
obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law". There must be a 
"determination"; and it must be in respect of a person's "rights, obligations, or 
interests protected or recognised by law". How does Article 14(1) of the 
Covenant assist us to determine the meaning of these words? 
It will be recalled that Article 14(1) of the Covenant applies whenever a 
dispute arises in respect of a person's "rights and obligations in a suit at 
law".262 This is implicit in the word "determination", since logic suggests that a 
dispute must have arisen in respect of which the determination is required. 
Section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights also refers to a "determination". Section 
27(1) must be interpreted consistently with Article 14(1). It follows that 
section 27(1) also presupposes that a dispute has arisen in respect of which 
the determination is required. 
Moreover, it will be recalled that, under Article 14(1), the dispute must 
concern "rights and obligations"; and those rights and obligations must be 
rights and obligations "in a suit at law". If either of these conditions are not 
met, Article 14(1) will not apply. Under section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights, by 
contrast, the dispute must be "in respect of [a] person's rights, obligations, or 
262 See above, text accompanying nn 39-40. 
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interests protected or recognised by law". Can these words in section 27(1) be 
interpreted consistently with "rights and obligations in a suit at law"? 
It is apparent that the formulation in section 27(1) differs from that in Article 
14(1). None the less, the formulation in Article 14(1), it is suggested, remains 
highly relevant to the interpretation of the formulation in section 27(1). 
Section 27(1) is designed to implement Article 14(1) in New Zealand's 
domestic law. It follows that the formulation in section 27(1) must, if at all 
possible, be given an interpretation which ensures that section 27(1) applies in 
as wide a range of situations as does Article 14(1). 
In what range of situations does Article 14(1) apply? It will be recalled that 
Article 14(1) extends only to disputes over rights and obligations "which can 
be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law".
263 
Furthermore, the dispute may concern either an interference with an existing 
right, the scope of an existing right, the mode of exercise of an existing right, 
or whether a right actually exists.264 It follows, significantly, that Article 14(1) 
may apply to the exercise of discretions. The analysis under Article 14(1) is as 
follows. Where a person claims that a discretion should be exercised in her 
favour, a dispute arises as to whether the claimant has a right to have the 
discretion exercised in her favour. This is a dispute as to whether a right 
actually exists. Provided that it can be said, on arguable grounds, that the 
claimant has a right to have the discretion exercised in her favour, Article 
14(1) may apply,265 and the various requirements of Article 14(1) will need to 
be observed in the determination of the dispute. It will be a rare case where a 
person is unable to mount an arguable claim that she is entitled to have the 
263 See above, text accompanying nn 41. 
264 See above, text accompanying nn 42. 
265 Provided also that the tight, the existence of which is in dispute, is a tight "in a suit at law"
: see above nn 39-
40. 
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discretion exercised in her favour, since the European cases show that even an 
apparently unfettered discretion may be the source of an arguable right.266 
What impact does this have upon the interpretation of section 27(1)? It 
means that the formulation contained in section 27(1) ("in respect of [a] 
person's rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law") must, 
if at all possible, be interpreted so as to ensure that section 27(1) also applies 
whenever a person claims on arguable grounds that she has a right to have a 
discretion exercised in her favour. Can the formulation in section 27(1) be so 
interpreted? It is submitted that it can be. The word "interests", it is 
suggested, is able to accomodate the situation where a person claims on 
arguable grounds that she has a right to have a discretion exercised in her 
favour. The words "rights and obligations", moreover, may be treated as 
referring to disputes in respect of existing rights and obligations. The correct 
interpretation, it is submitted, is as follows: 
(a) Where a dispute arises in respect of either an interference with 
an existing right, the scope of an existing right, or the mode of 
exercise of an existing right, that may be regarded as a dispute 
in respect of a person's "rights ... protected or recognised by 
law" within the meaning of section 27(1). 
(b) Where a dispute arises as to whether a right actually exists, and 
it can be said on arguable grounds that the right exists, that may 
be regarded as a dispute in respect of a person's "interests 
protected or recognised by law" within the meaning of section 
27(1). 
It is important to note that "interests protected or recognised by law" in 
section 27(1) cannot be equated with "legitimate expectations". For a 
266 See above, text accompanying nn 52. 
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legitimate expectation to be generated, it is usually necessary for a decision-
maker to have given an undertaking or engaged in some past practice which 
leads the claimant to believe that the discretion will be exercised in his or her 
favour. These elements of undertaking and past practice are not prerequisites 
for the application of Article 14(1) of the Covenant and, accordingly, cannot 
be prerequisites for the application of section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights. All 
that is required is that there be arguable grounds on which it can be said that 
the claimant is entitled to have the discretion exercised in his or her favour; 
there is no additional requirement of an undertaking or past practice on the 
part of the decision-maker. 
It follows that the right to natural justice under section 27(1) of the Bill of 
Rights must apply in a wider range of situations than it does at Common Law. 
Although, in determining whether the right to natural justice applies, the 
courts no longer require that a dispute relate to an existing right,
267 it will 
usually be necessary for the claimant to establish, at the very least, that he has 
a legitimate expectation which deserves the protection of natural justice.
268 
Under section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights, a claimant is not required to 
establish a legitimate expectation. It is only necessary that he be able to show, 
on arguable grounds, that he is entitled to have the discretion exercised in his 
favour. 
It will be recalled that, under Article 14(1) of the Covenant, the rights and 
obligations to which the dispute relates must be rights and obligations "in a 
suit at law".269 The corresponding word in Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention is "civil". As has been seen, the European Court of Human Rights 
267 SeeDaganayasiv Minister of Immigration (1980) 2 NZLR 130, 143; Kioa v West (198S) 1S9 CLR SSO, 616-
617. 
268 See South Australia v O 'Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378, 386. 
269 See above, text accompanying nn 39-40. 
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has equated "civil" rights with "private" rights, thereby introducin
g a 
problematic distinction public-private distinction, although the Court
 has 
increasingly tended to blur the distinction.
270 There are indications, 
moreover, that the Human Rights Committee does not intend to adopt
 the 
public-private distinction in its interpretation of the words "in a suit at 
law" 
under Article 14(1) of the Covenant.271 
Should the New Zealand courts adopt a public-private distinction
 in 
interpreting the words "rights, obligations, or interests protected or recogn
ised 
by law" in section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights? It is submitted that they sh
ould 
not do so. The wording of section 27(1) does not suggest that any 
such 
distinction was intended to be adopted. Moreover, it would be erroneou
s to 
import this distinction on the basis that Article 14(1) of the Covena
nt is 
qualified by it. The provisions of the Covenant cannot be used to justi
fy a 
restrictive interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. This is m
ade 
plain by the Covenant itself, Article 5(2) of which provides: 
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the 
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to 
the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or 
custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize 
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. 
Accordingly, any restriction upon the rights contained in the Bill of Rights
 "on 
the pretext that the ... Covenant ... recognizes them to a lesser exten
t" is 
impermissible. The wording of section 27(1) cannot be read down
 by 
reference to any public-private distinction as may exist in Article 14(1) of
 the 
Covenant. 
It is also noteworthy that section 27(1) applies to disputes "in respect of [a]
 
person's" rights, obligations or interests. The words "in respect of [a] person's" 
270 See above, text accompanying nn 87-110. 
271 See above, text accompanying nn 39-40. 
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raises the question whether section 27(1) can apply in situations where a 
decision affects the rights, obligations or interests of many rather than only a 
few people or, for that matter, just one person. At Common Law the courts 
have always distinguished between "an exercise of a power on a large scale 
and one relating solely to the treatment of an individual, the former being 
more difficult for the [courts] to control".272 It is submitted, however, that 
section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights requires the courts to abandon this 
approach. The European Court of Human Rights has refused to accept that 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention cannot apply in situations where a 
great many people are affected by the exercise of a power. In Allan Jacobsson 
v Sweden273 the Court held that Article 6(1) applied to a dispute between the 
authorities and the applicant in respect of prolonged building prohibitions, 
despite the fact that the prohibitions affected a great number of property 
owners. In the Court's view, there could be "no doubt that the prohibitions 
severely restricted" the applicant's right and that "the outcome of the 
proceedings whereby he challenged their lawfulness was directly decisive for 
his exercise thereof'.274 Section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights falls to be 
interpreted in the light of this jurisprudence. Accordingly, in determining 
whether a dispute is "in respect of [a] person's" rights, obligations or interests 
within the meaning of section 27(1), it is necessary to focus on whether the 
decisions complained of have serious and direct consequences for the rights, 
obligations or intertests of the person concerned. The fact that many others 
have been similarly affected may have consequences for the content of the 
right to natural justice, but it cannot preclude its application.275 
272 Above n 267, Daganayasi. See also Ridge v Baldwin (1964] AC 40, 72; above n 267, Kioa, 620. 
273 Above n 38,Allan Jacobsson . 
274 Above n 38,Allan Jacobsson, 70, para 70. 
275 The White Paper Commentary on the Draft Bill of Rights expressly supports the view that s 27(1) does not 
apply where the decision affects the many rather than the few: 
It is not envisaged that the provision will normally apply where the determination is a general 
one affecting persons as a class or indirectly - for example a change in local body rates. The 
phrase "in respect or• is designed to achieve this. 
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It emerges that the right to natural justice under section 27(1) of the Bill of 
Rights applies in a much wider range of situations than it does at Common 
Law. Its application is not restricted to situations where the dispute in 
question concerns existing rights or even legitimate expectations. Nor is the 
application of natural justice limited to those cases where only one person as 
opposed to many people are affected by the impugned decisions. Section 
27(1) applies whenever there is a dispute in respect of rights which can be 
said, at least on arguable grounds, to exist in law. 
2 What does section 27 ( 1) guarantee? 
Section 27(1) guarantees that the "principles of natural justice" must be 
observed by "any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to 
make a determination" in respect of a person's rights, obligations or interests. 
What impact does Article 14(1) of the Covenant have upon the meaning of 
this guarantee? Article 14(1) guarantees the right to have a dispute 
determined by a "tribunal" which is independent and impartial and which 
meets the various requirements of the Article. Section 27(1) is designed to 
implement Article 14(1) of the Covenant in New Zealand's domestic law and, 
accordingly, must be interpreted consistently with that Article. In particular 
the words "principles of natural justice" must be interpreted by reference to 
Article 14(1). It is submitted that the words "principles of natural justice" can 
sustain an interpretation which accomodates the requirements of Article 
14(1). 
However, Fogarty takes the view that s 27( 1) has the potential for wider application: 
. , , given the aoi!ity to read the section in the plural and the indeterminate character of the 
phrase "interests protected or recognised by law", there is scope to apply the section to policy-
formation processes eg what about the principles of natural justice being applied to a review of 
the merits of keeping open a long-term residential institution for disabled people? 
J Fogarty "David and Goliath: the State of the Play of Judicial Review in the '90s" [1991] NZLJ 338, 340. 
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It will be recalled that, under Article 14(1) of the Covenant, the body which 
has the power to determine a dispute relating to rights and obligations in a 
suit at law must act as an independent and impartial tribunal when 
determining the dispute.276 It matters not that the body performs non-judicial 
functions at other times, provided that, when performing its judicial function, 
the body acts independently and impartially and exhibits the other features 
which are common and fundamental to "tribunals" in the substantive sense of 
the term.277 This requirement of Article 14(1) of the Covenant must have an 
impact upon the meaning of the concept of the "principles of natural justice" 
in section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights. The concept of the "principles of natural 
justice" must be interpreted consistently with the requirements of Article 
14(1). The concept is inherently flexible, and can accomodate all the aspects 
of fair procedure which Article 14(1) guarantees. It follows that, in order to 
observe the "principles of natural justice" within the meaning of section 27(1 ), 
a "tribunal or other public authority" must, when determining a dispute, act as 
an "independent and impartial tribunal" within the meaning of Article 14(1) of 
the Covenant. 
It will be recalled that the concepts of a "tribunal", of "independence" and of 
"impartiality" in Article 14(1) are each have fundamental features. The 
concept of a "tribunal" in the substantive sense of the term denotes bodies 
which are independent of the executive and of the parties to the dispute, 
whose members' term of office is of adequate duration, and whose 
proceedings afford the necessary guarantees.278 Given that section 27(1) of 
the Bill of Rights must be interpreted consistently with Article 14(1) of the 
276 See above, text accompanying nn 189-248. 
277 See above, text accompanying nn 210-212. 
278 See below, text accompanying nn 189-213. 
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Covenant, these features must be regarded as a part of the "principles of 
natural justice" which decision-makers are required by section 27(1) to 
observe. The requirement which has the most far-reaching implications for 
administrative decision-making is the requirement to act independently of the 
executive. Many decisions are taken in the performance of an administrative 
function as part of the executive. Section 27(1) requires, however, that the 
person or body in which the decision-making power has been reposed must 
act judicially and independently of the executive when making a 
determination in respect of a person's rights, obligations or interests. As 
Campbell and Fell's case indicates,279 the fact that a person or body performs 
two functions - one administrative, one judicial - does not cause difficulty, 
provided that the two functions are kept separate. It is necessary, however, 
that an appearance of independence be maintained;280 even if there is 
independence in fact, the nature of the links between the decision-maker and 
the executive may generate such doubt as to invalidate the decision. 
Moreover, the test for impartiality under Article 14(1) of the Covenant must 
be incorporated into the "principles of natural justice" under section 27(1) of 
the Bill of Rights. What is important to note is that the tests for impartiality 
under Article 14(1) and, hence, section 27(1) are markedly different from the 
"real likelihood of bias" and "reasonable suspicion of bias" tests to which the 
Common Law has always adhered.281 As has been seen, impartiality under 
Article 14(1) is assessed both subjectively and objectively. Although a lack of 
subjective impartiality is always difficult to prove, because the personal 
impartiality of the members of a tribunal is presumed, the test for a lack of 
objective impartiality, which focuses on the appearance of impartiality and the 
279 See above, text accompanying nn 210-212. 
280 See above, text accompnaying nn 227-234. 
281 See Anderton v Auckland City Council [ 1978] 1 NZLR 657. See further G D S Taylor Judicial Review : A 
New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) 288-292, paras 13.48-13.51. 
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internal organisation of the tribunal, is easier to satisfy.282 It is by reference to 
these tests that the impartiality of decision-makers must be assessed. 
In a recent case concerning alleged pre-determination by a judge, the Court of 
Appeal applied the Common Law tests for bias. Matua Finance Ltd v 
Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd283 involved an application for the production 
of documents claimed to be privileged on the basis of the fraud exception to a 
claim of legal professional privilege. There was the possibility that the judge, 
in determining whether the exception applied, might decide to exercise the 
power to inspect documents under Rule 311(1) of the High Court Rules. 
Counsel for the defendants contended that the application should be referred 
to another judge. The question of fraud was the or a main issue in the 
litigation; if the judge were to decide to inspect the documents and then to 
rule that they should be disclosed to the plaintiffs, so the argument ran, the 
impression could be created that he had predetermined the fraud issue. The 
Court of Appeal did "not accept that any reasonable, fair-minded and 
informed observer would consider that, by making the kind of prima facie 
ruling now a possibility, the Judge would display any predetermination or 
appearance of bias".284 The Court refrred also to the "real suspicion of bias" 
and "real danger or likelihood of bias" tests for lack of impartaility.
285 
Although it may not have changed the result in the case, the Court of Appeal 
in Matua, it is submitted, should have invoked section 27(1) of Bill of Rights in 
dealing with the predetermination issue. In view of section 27(1), it is no 
longer appropriate to apply the Common Law tests for bias; it is necessary to 
apply the tests for subjective and objective impartiality as formulated by the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
282 See below, text accompanying n 238. 
283 Unreported, 28 July I 993, Court of Appeal CA 165/93. 
284 Above n 283, 7. 
285 Above n 283, 7. 
78 
It follows that, under section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights, the content of the 
right to natural justice is more extensive than it is at Common law. This is 
because section 27(1) must be interpreted consistently with Article 14(1) of 
the Covenant, which it is designed to implement in New Zealand's domestic 
law. Article 14(1) requires that the body which has the power to determine 
the dispute must act as an independent and impartial tribunal. The result is a 
set of procedural safeguards which far exceeds the protections afforded by the 
Common Law. 
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IV CONCLUSION 
Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that, "[i]n the determination of his rights and obligations in a suit at 
law, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law". This means that, 
wherever a dispute arises in respect of rights and obligations which can be 
said, at least on arguable grounds, to exist under domestic law, there must be 
a possibility of submitting the dispute for determination to a tribunal which 
meets the various requirements of Article 14(1). This interpretation of 
Article 14(1) is strongly supported by the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights under Article 6(1) of the European Convention. 
It has been argued in this paper that this has direct consequences for the 
interpretaion of section 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights. Section l 
27(1) is designed to implement Article 14(1) of the Covenant in New 
Zealand's domestic law. Section 27(1) must be interpreted consistently with 
Article 14(1). It follows that section 27(1) will apply in the same range of 
situations, and provide the same procedural guarantees, as does Artic e 11-( 1 
of the Covenant. 
This has far-reaching implications. It means that the right to natural justice 
under section 27(1) of the Billl of Rights provides far greater protection to 
those affected by administrative processes than does the Common Law. Far 
from being a codification of the Common Law, section 27(1) is a new charter 
of administrative justice. 
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